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GROUP JUDGMENTS: STATISTICAL
MEANS, DELIBERATION, AND
INFORMATION MARKETS
CAss R. SUNSTEIN*
How can groups elicit and aggregate the information held by their individual mem-
bers? There are three possibilities. Groups might use the statistical mean of indi-
vidual judgments; they might encourage deliberation; or they might use information
markets. In both private and public institutions, deliberation is the standard way of
proceeding; but for two reasons, deliberating groups often fail to make good deci-
sions. First, the statements and acts of some group members convey relevant infor-
mation, and that information often leads other people not to disclose what they
know. Second, social pressures, imposed by some group members, often lead other
group members to silence themselves because of fear of disapproval and associated
harms. As a result, deliberation often produces a series of unfortunate results: the
amplification of errors, hidden profiles, cascade effects, and group polarization. A
variety of steps can be taken to ensure that deliberating groups obtain the informa-
tion held by their members; restructuring private incentives, in a way that increases
disclosure, is the place to start. Information markets have substantial advantages
over group deliberation; such markets count among the most intriguing institutional
innovations of the last quarter-century and should be used far more frequently than
they now are. One advantage of information markets is that they tend to correct,
rather than to amplify, the effects of individual errors. Another advantage is that
they create powerful incentives to disclose, rather than to conceal, privately held
information. Information markets thus provide the basis for a Hayekian critique of
many current celebrations of political deliberation. They also provide a valuable
heuristic for understanding how to make deliberation work better. These points
bear on the discussion of normative issues, in which deliberation might also fail to
improve group thinking, and in which identifiable reforms could produce better
outcomes. Applications include the behavior of juries, multimember judicial
panels, administrative agencies, and congressional committees; analogies, also
involving information aggregation, include open source software, Internet "wikis,"
and weblogs.
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, the University of Chicago. For valuable comments, I am
grateful to Michael Abramowicz, Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Jon Elster, Bernard
Harcourt, Saul Levmore, Douglas Lichtman, Richard Posner, and Adam Samaha. Ver-
sions of this Article were presented as the Harold Leventhal Memorial Lecture at
Columbia Law School and as the keynote lecture on Whither Democracy? at Brandeis
University, and I am very grateful for the comments and suggestions offered on those
occasions. I am also grateful to participants in workshops at the Brookings-American
Enterprise Institute Joint Center on Regulatory Policy, Harvard Law School, the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the University of Chicago Law
School, and the Yale Law School. Many thanks also to Robert Park for extraordinary
research assistance. Thanks above all to Reid Hastie, for a great deal of patient help and
tutoring.
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GROUP JUDGMENTS
"Increased accuracy is a common justification for using groups,
rather than individuals, to make judgments. However, the empirical
literature shows that groups excel as judges only under limited condi-
tions.... [G]roups performing tasks that involve solutions that are not
easily demonstrable tend to perform at the level of their average
members. '"1
"The presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs was so
strong that formalized [Intelligence Community] mechanisms estab-
lished to challenge assumptions and 'group think,' such as 'red teams,'
'devil's advocacy,' and other types of alternative or competitive anal-
ysis, were not utilized."'2
"Sometimes important forecasts are made in traditional group
meetings. This ... should be avoided because it does not use informa-
tion efficiently. A structured approach for combining independent
forecasts is invariably more accurate."'3
INTRODUCTION
How can groups obtain the information that their members have?
There are three principal answers. First, groups might use the statis-
tical mean (or median) of the independent judgments of their mem-
bers. Second, groups might attempt to improve on those independent
judgments by using deliberation and asking for the reasoned exchange
of facts, ideas, and opinions. Third, groups might use information
markets, through which group members, or those outside of the
group, "bet" on their judgments about future events. Of course each
of these methods can take diverse forms; one of my principal goals
here is to explore which forms are most likely to produce good out-
comes. The choice has implications for many institutions involved in
law and politics, including the White House, juries, administrative
agencies, congressional committees, federal courts of appeals, and
even the Supreme Court itself.
Both private and public institutions tend not to rely on statistical
means, and they rarely enlist information markets. Such institutions
typically prefer to make decisions through deliberation. Generalizing
from this fact, many people have paid a great deal of attention to
1 Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments,
121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 149 (1997) [hereinafter Gigone & Hastie, Proper Analysis].
2 SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE 108TH CONGRESS, U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ: CONCLU-
SIONS 7 (full version, S. REP. No. 108-301 (2004)), available at http://intelligence.senate.
gov.
3 J. Scott Armstrong, Combining Forecasts, in PRINCIPLES OF FORECASTING 417, 433
(J. Scott Armstrong ed., 2001).
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deliberative accounts of democracy itself. The theoretical foundations
of deliberative democracy have been elaborated in some detail,4 and
increasing attention is being devoted to methods for making demo-
cratic processes more deliberative. James Fishkin, for example, has
pioneered the idea of the "deliberative poll," by which people are
asked to deliberate together on public issues and to state their judg-
ments only after the deliberative process is complete.5 Fishkin and
Bruce Ackerman have gone so far as to suggest a new national hol-
iday, Deliberation Day, on which people are asked to congregate in
groups in order to discuss and debate important issues of public
policy. 6 Perhaps the proposal is unrealistic; perhaps citizens as a
whole should not be expected to deliberate much in a liberal society.7
But even if this is true, leaders in the public and private sphere might
be urged to deliberate more than they now do, and many accounts of
deliberative democracy emphasize the importance of deliberation by
representatives. 8
Why, exactly, is deliberation important or even desirable? A cen-
tral answer must be that deliberation will result in wiser judgments
and better outcomes.9 But does deliberation actually have this effect?
The answer is by no means clear. 10 In fact, group members may
4 See generally DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (collecting diverse
treatments of deliberative democracy); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996) (defending deliberative democracy and discussing its
preconditions); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1998) (elaborating
deliberative conception of democracy). On the role of deliberative democracy in the
American framing, see JOSEPH M. BESSET=E, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON 6-39 (1994),
contending that framers contemplated deliberative democracy.
5 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 162-76 (1995).
6 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3-16 (2004) (pro-
posing national day for political deliberation).
7 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 134-43 (2003)
(challenging deliberative democracy as unrealistic).
8 See BESSEIE, supra note 4, at 1-2 (discussing founders' emphasis on deliberating
through representatives).
9 There are other possibilities, of course. Perhaps deliberation has educative effects or
contributes to individual self-development. Perhaps it legitimates decisions or increases
the likelihood that people will acquiesce in them. Cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW 115-24 (1990) (discussing effects of fair procedures on legitimacy of and compli-
ance with legal decisions). I am mostly putting these arguments to one side and focusing
on the possibility that deliberation will improve outcomes. As noted below, however,
deliberation tends to increase confidence and to decrease variance, even when it does not
increase accuracy; it follows that deliberation might be justified because of its legitimating
effects even when it fails to produce better outcomes. See infra text accompanying notes
77-84.
10 See Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality, in JUDGMENTS,
DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 116, 121-26 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002)
(discussing factors that can cause groups to judge less accurately than individuals); Gigone
& Hastie, Proper Analysis, supra note 1, at 161-62 (discussing how group judgments are
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impose pressures on one another, leading to a consensus on falsehood
rather than truth. The idea of "groupthink," coined and elaborated by
Irving Janis, suggests the possibility that groups will tend toward uni-
formity and censorship, thus failing to combine information and
enlarge the range of arguments.11 Without structural protections,
both private and public groups may well err, not in spite of delibera-
tion but because of it. By contrast, the use of statistical means or of
information markets will often lead to more accurate decisions.
As an example of a failure of deliberation, consider the account
in the 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
That report explicitly accused the CIA of groupthink, through which
the agency's predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq caused it
to fail to explore alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the
information that it actually held. 12 In the Committee's view, the CIA
"demonstrated several aspects of group think: examining few alterna-
tives, selective gathering of information, pressure to conform within
the group or withhold criticism, and collective rationalization."'13
Thus the agency showed a "tendency to reject information that contra-
dicted the presumption" that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.' 4
Because of that presumption, the agency failed to use its own formal-
ized methods "to challenge assumptions and 'group think,' such as
'red teams,' 'devil's advocacy,' and other types of alternative or com-
petitive analysis."' 5 Above all, the Committee's conclusions empha-
size the CIA's failure to elicit and aggregate information that was
actually in the possession of its employees.This claim is a remarkable and even uncanny echo of one that
followed the 2003 investigation of failures at NASA surrounding the
explosion of the space shuttle Columbia. The investigation stressed
the agency's similar failure to elicit competing views, including those
based on information held by agency employees. 16 The Columbia
Accident Investigation Board explicitly attributed the accident to
more variable than mean judgments of their members); Garold Stasser & William Titus,
Hidden Profiles: A Brief History, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 304, 308-09 (2003) [hereinafter
Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles] (discussing failures of groups to incorporate shared
information).
11 See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 7-9 (2d ed., rev. 1983) (discussing phenomenon
of groupthink, by which people end up promoting consensus that does not reflect informa-
tion held by individual group members).
12 See REPORT OF THE 108TH CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 4-7.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Id. at 6.
15 Id. at 8.
16 1 COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., NASA, THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT 97-204 (2003), available at http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/
home/CAIBVoll.html.
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NASA's unfortunate culture, one that does too little to elicit informa-
tion. In the Board's words, NASA lacks "checks and balances. ' 17 It
pressures people to follow a "party line."'1 8 At NASA, "it is difficult
for minority and dissenting opinions to percolate up through the
agency's hierarchy"' 9-even though, the Board contended, effective
safety programs require the encouragement of minority opinions and
a willingness to acknowledge, rather than to conceal, bad news.20
To explain why deliberation fails, I explore the consequences of
two sets of influences on members of deliberating groups.21 The first
consists of informational influences, which cause group members to
fail to disclose what they know because of deference to the informa-
tion publicly announced by others. The second involves social pres-
sures, which lead people to silence themselves in order to avoid
reputational sanctions, such as the disapproval of peers and supervi-
sors. As a result of these forces, groups often do not correct but
instead amplify individual errors, emphasize shared information at the
expense of unshared information, fall victim to cascade effects, and
end up in a more extreme position in line with the predeliberation
tendencies of their members.22 Even federal judges are vulnerable to
the relevant pressures, as both Republican and Democratic appoin-
tees show especially ideological voting when they are sitting with
other judges appointed by presidents of the same political party.23
Because of those pressures, deliberative processes often fail to
achieve their minimal goal of aggregating the information that the rel-
evant deliberators actually have. Indeed, such processes often fail to
aggregate information even as they decrease variance, and increase
confidence, among their members.24 A confident, cohesive, error-
prone group is nothing to celebrate. On the contrary, it might be
17 Id. at 12.
18 Id. at 102 (internal citation omitted).
19 Id. at 183.
20 Id.
21 1 explore these mechanisms from a different direction in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003), but without attention to statistical groups and informa-
tion markets, and without focusing on amplification of errors, hidden profiles, and the
common knowledge effect, which are major emphases here.
22 This last possibility is emphasized in ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
SECOND EDITION 200-45 (1986). See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 112.
23 See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304-06, 314
(2004) (showing effects of panel composition on judicial behavior).
24 See Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confi-
dence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interac-
tive Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305,
306 (1995) (showing that deliberation does not necessarily increase accuracy, but it does
increase confidence of group members).
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extremely dangerous both to itself and to others.25 I shall suggest that
these various problems raise serious conceptual and empirical ques-
tions about the accounts of deliberative democracy offered by Jiirgen
Habermas,26 Fishkin 27 Ackerman, 28 and Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, 29 among others. 30 Suppose that deliberation is working in
the way that theorists prescribe; suppose, that is, that participants are
operating on terms of equality, nonstrategically, and otherwise in
accordance with what might be seen as the internal morality of delib-
erative democracy.31 Even then, deliberation might lead to extremely
serious blunders for reasons that have yet to be addressed by theorists
of deliberative democracy.32 Another way to put the point is that
deliberative democrats have failed to engage adequately with either
cognitive or social psychology. An understanding of the widely dis-
persed nature of information and arguments, and of the difficulty of
aggregating that information and those arguments through delibera-
tive processes, provides an explanation of why serious blunders are
likely to occur.
How might such blunders be avoided? As we shall see, informa-
tion markets often outperform both statistical and deliberating
groups, simply because they are so effective at pooling information.
Indeed, information markets realign private incentives in a way that
makes them exceptionally well-designed to reduce the problems that
infect deliberating groups. Such markets are worth investigating in
part because they provide an illuminating route by which to explore
some characteristic defects in deliberative processes-and by which to
identify reforms that should make them work better. If deliberative
processes are to be improved, it might well be by building on the
insights provided by the successes of information markets. The result
of that rebuilding effort should be a revised and strengthened concep-
tion of the uses and limits of deliberative democracy, in a way that
gives a better understanding of that idea-one that is more closely
25 For a comparison of democratic and nondemocratic regimes concluding that open
debate on policy makes regimes less vulnerable to overconfidence with respect to war, see
DOMINIC D.P. JOHNSON, OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR: THE HAVOC AND GLORY OF POSI-
TIVE ILLUSIONS 180-83 (2004).
26 See generally HABERMAS, supra note 4.
27 See generally FISHKIN, supra note 5.
28 See generally ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 6.
29 See generally GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4.
30 For a collection of views, see DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 4.
31 For a brief and clear statement of the preconditions for deliberation, see Jirgen
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author's Reflections, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 937,
940-41 (1999). For an overlapping view emphasizing moral requirements imposed on par-
ticipants by the deliberative ideal, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 39-51.
32 See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
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attuned to both cognitive and social psychology. In addition, informa-
tion markets are worth investigating in their own right, if only because
they promise to provide a supplement to deliberation, one that should
improve social decisions.33
One of my chief goals, in short, is to mend deliberative processes,
not to end them. As we shall see, both social norms and institutional
design can go a long way toward reducing the problems that lead to
deliberative blunders in a way that has implications for the perform-
ance of many institutions, including legislatures, committees, and even
multimember judicial panels.
To keep the analysis simple, I shall focus not on controversial
judgments of value but on questions with demonstrably correct
answers. An understanding of how deliberation finds, and fails to
find, those answers should have implications for its potential and its
limitations with respect to normative questions as well. If deliberation
often fails to produce good answers to simple questions of fact, then it
is also likely to fail to produce good answers to disputed issues of
value. The solution to many such questions depends at least in part on
resolution of factual issues; it is difficult to take a stand on proposals
to raise the minimum wage, to engage in preemptive war, or to over-
rule Roe v. Wade34 without resolving several issues of fact. And even
when factual issues are not central, deliberation can, in principle,
ensure more sensible judgments. 35 Unfortunately, however, the
problems posed by informational pressure and social influences apply
in normative domains not less than elsewhere. I will therefore offer
some suggestions for how groups can reduce those problems through
structural reforms.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I begins the analysis with
a description of a simple, nondeliberative method for aggregating pri-
vately-held information, one that takes the average of predeliberation
judgments. The resulting judgments of these "statistical groups" are
sometimes remarkably accurate. They also provide a useful bench-
mark for assessing deliberative judgments. 36 A key goal of delibera-
tion is to improve on the predeliberation judgments of individuals and
groups; if we understand how statistical groups perform, we can have
33 For an ambitious account, see Robin Hanson, Shall We Vote on Values, but Bet on
Beliefs? 5-27 (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University
Law Review).
34 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35 This is the thesis of FISHKIN, supra note 5, at 16, 40-43.
36 These often are described as the judgments of "statisticized groups." See Irving
Lorge et al., A Survey of Studies Contrasting the Quality of Group Performance and Indi-
vidual Performance, 1920-1957, 55 PsYci-iOL. BULL. 337, 344 (1958).
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a better sense of the potential virtues of deliberation and also a better
appreciation of what discussion might be expected to accomplish.
Part II explores how deliberation might be expected, in principle,
to improve on the judgments of statistical groups. Unfortunately, the
expectation of improvement is often dashed, largely because of the
effects of informational pressures and social influences. These pres-
sures and influences contribute to the amplification of errors, hidden
profiles, cascade effects, and group polarization. Part II explores
these problems and attempts to square some apparently conflicting
evidence about the performance of deliberating groups; it investigates
the possibility that some groups will do as well as or even better than
their best members.
Part III outlines structural reforms that are intended to ensure
that group members reveal what they know-for example, by
requiring anonymous statements of beliefs before deliberation begins,
by assigning specified roles to participants in deliberation, and by
structuring incentives to produce disclosure of privately held informa-
tion. Two reforms are especially important here: "priming" partici-
pants by asking them to think critically rather than to behave
cooperatively and asking people to attempt to improve the group's
overall decision, rather than to make an individually correct choice.
Part IV identifies and compares information markets, in which
people bet on the outcomes of events. Information markets have per-
formed remarkably well in many diverse settings-by, for example,
calling the 2004 presidential election with uncanny accuracy 37 and also
predicting all eight of the major Oscar winners in 2005.38 Because
information markets restructure people's incentives, overcome collec-
tive action problems faced by individual group members, and allow
informed traders to play a large role in setting "prices," they have
advantages over both statistical judgments and deliberative judg-
ments. They might well be used as a supplement to or even a replace-
ment for collective deliberation. Part V briefly discusses how the
analysis might apply to normative questions.
I
STATISTICAL GROUPS
Suppose that there is a question about some disputed issue of
fact. The issue might involve past events. How many home runs did
Hank Aaron hit? When was Calvin Coolidge elected president? Or
37 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
38 1 am referring here to the Hollywood Stock Exchange. See infra notes 333-36 and
accompanying text.
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the issue might involve a prediction about the future. Will a district
court decision be reversed on appeal? Does a foreign country pose a
serious threat to national security? Is the United States likely to have
difficulty in winning a particular war? Will the poverty rate, or con-
centrations of specified pollutants, increase in the next year? A great
deal of evidence suggests that, under certain conditions, a promising
way to answer such questions is this: Ask a large number of people
and take the mean answer. 39 When the relevant conditions are met,40
the mean answer, which we might describe as the group's "statistical
answer," is often accurate, where accuracy is measured by reference to
objectively demonstrable facts.
Consider a simple example. In 2004, members of the Society for
American Baseball Research were asked, in advance, to predict the
winners of the baseball playoffs.41 Remarkably, strong majorities of
the 413 respondents correctly predicted all of the first round winners:
New York, Boston, Houston, and St. Louis. At least as remarkably, a
majority predicted, correctly, that St. Louis would win the National
League pennant, and a large plurality predicted that the Red Sox
would win the American League pennant. A plurality also favored
the Red Sox to win the World Series. Hence the favored choice of the
expert group was right 100% of the time.
If this striking finding can be generalized, it is a helpful way to
approach the uses of both deliberation and information markets. If
statistical answers are often accurate, then accuracy on the part of
deliberating groups might not be a product of deliberation at all. Per-
haps deliberation does not much matter, and accuracy simply comes
from the fact that significant numbers of people are being asked to
state their views. And if statistical answers are accurate, information
markets might be supremely accurate, simply because investors are
being asked to back their views with dollars. Consider here the fact
that with statistical groups, individual judgments are in a sense "pure";
they are independent and hence unaffected by an understanding of
what other group members think. So too with information markets, in
which there is no public give-and-take among group members.42 Are
39 When groups are large, of course, and not subject to systematic biases, the mean and
the median will tend to converge.
40 See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
41 John Zajc, THIS WEEK IN SABR (Soc'y for Am. Baseball Research, Cleveland,
Ohio), Oct. 9, 2004 (Results of playoff prediction survey), at http://www.sabr.org/sabr.cfm?
a=cms,c,1123,3,212.
42 Of course investment decisions may result from social deliberation, and the indi-
vidual judgments that enter into the judgments of statistical groups are often affected by
such deliberation. The point is that group deliberation is, by definition, not a part of statis-
tical aggregation through either statistical groups or the price mechanism.
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statistical groups, or information markets, more or less likely to be
accurate because of the absence of deliberation?
It is well-known that statistical answers from groups of suffi-
ciently large sizes tend to match the views of population-wide sam-
ples.4 3 This finding bears on issues as diverse as the use of juries as a
measure of community sentiment" and the remarkable success of
Google, the search engine; Google is good at finding what a particular
searcher wants because it knows what most searchers want.45 But
here the question is what is true, not what populations think. Let us
therefore explore how statistical groups actually perform.
A. Evidence of Statistical Group Accuracy
Many of the studies of statistical groups involve quantitative esti-
mates. Consider a few examples:
1. In an early study, Hazel Knight asked college students to esti-
mate the temperature of a classroom. 46 Individual judgments
ranged from 60 degrees to 85 degrees; the statistical judgment
of the group was 72.4 degrees, very close to the actual temper-
ature of 72 degrees. That judgment was better than 80% of
the individual judgments.
2. Judging the numbers of beans in a jar, the group average is
almost always better than the judgments of the vast majority of
individual members. In one such experiment, a group of fifty-
six students was asked about a jar containing 850 beans; the
group estimate was 871, a better guess than all but one of the
students.47
3. Asking two hundred students to rank items by weight, one
experimenter found that the group's average estimate was
94% accurate-a figure surpassed by only five individuals. 48
43 See H.J. Eysenck, The Validity of Judgments as a Function of Number of Judges, 25 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 650, 651 (1939) (showing that large groups reflect judgments of
larger populations).
44 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 YALE L.J. 2071,
2095-99 (1998) (showing that small groups often reflect judgments of community as whole,
at least when their judgments are made on bounded scale).
45 See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web
Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS & ISDN Sys. 107, 107-10 (1998), available at
http://newdbpubs.stanford.edu:8090/pub/1998-8.
46 Lorge et al., supra note 36, at 344.
47 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 5 (2004) (discussing jar
experiment).
48 Id.; Kate Gordon, Further Observations on Group Judgments of Lifted Weights, 1 J.
PSYCHOL. 105, 106 (1936); Kate Gordon, Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights, 7
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4. Asked to rank ten piles of buckshot, each only slightly dif-
ferent in size from the others, the combined group's average
guess was 94.5% accurate, far more so than that of almost all
individual group members.49
5. The British scientist Francis Galton sought to draw lessons
about collective intelligence by examining a competition in
which contestants attempted to judge the weight of a fat ox at
a regional fair in England. The ox weighed 1198 pounds; the
average guess, from the 787 contestants, was 1197 pounds. 50
In light of these findings, many questions might plausibly be
answered not deliberatively, but simply by asking a large group of
people and selecting the average response. Imagine that a large com-
pany is attempting to project its sales for the following year. Might it
do best to poll its salespeople and to choose the average number on
the assumption that it is likely to be correct?51 Or suppose that a
company is deciding whether to hire a new employee. Should it ask
relevant personnel, not to deliberate, but about their individual views
on whether the employee's performance is likely to meet a certain
level? Or turn to the legal context and suppose that the question is
whether a case should be settled. Ought a law firm to poll its lawyers
about the expected outcome at trial? Or consider the political domain
and suppose that the question is whether a war effort, or an environ-
mental initiative, will go well by some identifiable standard. Should
the President poll his advisers and take the median answer? To
answer these questions, we have to know why, in the relevant studies,
the median judgment is so accurate.
B. The Condorcet Jury Theorem
The accuracy of judgments of statistical groups is best explained
by reference to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. 52 To see how the Jury
Theorem works, suppose that people are answering the same question
with two possible answers, one false and one true, and that the
average probability that each voter will answer correctly exceeds 50%.
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 398, 399-400 (1924) (offering evidence on assessments of
weights).
49 Richard S. Bruce, Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights and Visual Dis-
crimination, 1 J. PSYCHOL. 117, 117-21 (1936).
50 SUROWIECKI, supra note 47, at xi-xiii.
51 Some affirmative evidence can be found in Armstrong, supra note 3, at 417, 419-20,
427, 433-35.
52 See William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group Judg-
ment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 147, 152-54 (2002) (describing Condorcet Jury Theorem).
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The Jury Theorem holds that the probability of a correct answer, by a
majority of the group, increases toward certainty as the size of the
group increases. 53 The importance of the Jury Theorem lies in the
demonstration that groups are likely to do better than individuals, and
large groups better than small ones, if majority rule is used and if each
person is more likely than not to be correct. The last proviso is
extremely important. Suppose that each individual in a group is more
likely to be wrong than right. If so, the likelihood that the group will
decide correctly falls to zero as the size of the group increases.
In the context of statistical judgments, several of Condorcet's
stringent and somewhat unrealistic assumptions are met. Indeed, the
likelihood that they will be met is higher with statistical groups than
with deliberating ones. Condorcet assumed that people would be
unaffected by whether their votes would be decisive, that people
would not be affected by one another's votes, and that the probability
that one group member would be right would be statistically unrelated
to the probability that another group member would be right.54 The
first two assumptions plainly hold for statistical groups. People do not
know what others are saying and hence they cannot be influenced by a
belief that their judgments will make the difference to that of the
group. The third assumption may or may not be violated. Those who
have similar training, or who work closely together, will be likely to
see things in the same way,55 and those involved in statistical groups
might well meet these conditions. On the other hand, the Condorcet
Jury Theorem has been shown to be robust to violations of this third
assumption. 56
To see why statistical groups perform well, consider the problems
just described and note that even if everyone in the group is not more
than 50% likely to be right, the Theorem's predictions may well
continue to hold. Suppose, for example, that 60% of people are 51%
likely to be right and that 40% of people are 50% likely to be right; or
that 45% of people are 40% likely to be right and that 55% of people
are 65% likely to be right; or even that 51% of people are 51% likely
to be right and that 49% of people are merely 50% likely to be right.
Even under these conditions, the likelihood of a correct answer will
move toward 100% as the size of the group increases. It will not move
as quickly as it would if every group member were highly likely to be
53 The theorem is based on some simple arithmetic. Suppose, for example, that there is
a three-person group, in which each member has a 67% probability of being right. The
probability that a majority vote will produce the correct answer is 74%. Cf id. at 153.
54 See id. at 153.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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right, but it will nonetheless move. We could imagine endless varia-
tions on these numbers. The point is that even if a significant per-
centage of the group is not more likely to be right than wrong, or even
if many group members are more likely to be wrong than right, an
accurate result can be expected if the group is sufficiently large.
Of course most of the relevant judgments in studies of statistical
groups do not involve a binary choice; consider the question how
many beans are in a jar, how many pounds a given object weighs, or
how many copies of a certain book will sell in the following year. But
the answers to such questions are not analytically different from those
in binary choices. In answering the relevant questions, each person is
effectively being asked to answer a long series of binary questions-
ten beans or a thousand beans, twenty beans or five hundred beans,
fifty beans or one hundred beans, and so on. If a sufficiently large
group is asked to answer such questions, and if most individual
answers will be better than random, the mean answer will be highly
accurate. Of course the combination of probabilities for a series of
binary results might mean that things will turn out poorly. If someone
is 51% likely to answer each of two questions correctly, the
probability that she will answer both questions correctly is only
slightly higher than 25%. But with large groups, enough people are
likely to make better-than-random guesses on the questions involved
in certain quantitative judgments that the average estimate will have a
high degree of accuracy. 57
Compare a situation in which only 49% of the group is likely to
be better than random. If so, the likelihood of a mistake will move
toward 100% under the same condition. But for the number of beans
in a jar, or the weight of an ox, most people are not wholly at sea. The
accuracy of the median judgment, for large groups, is simply an appli-
cation of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. And, in certain circumstances,
deliberating groups will act in roughly the same way, aggregating their
information to produce remarkably accurate results. 58
57 On some of the technical complexities, see Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epi-
stemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277, 283-88,
295-97 (2001). For a popular illustration, consider the television show Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire? In this show, contestants, when stumped, are permitted to ask a personally
appointed "expert" (a friend who the contestant thinks knows a great deal) or the studio
audience. The studio audience significantly outperforms the expert. See SUROWIECKI,
supra note 47, at 3-4.
58 Bottom et al., supra note 52, at 160-61.
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C. Errors
In this light, we can identify two sets of situations in which the
judgment of a statistical group will be incorrect. The first are those in
which group members show a systematic bias. The second, a general-
ization of the first, are those in which their answers are worse than
random. The failures of statistical judgments in these circumstances
have strong implications for deliberation as well.
1. Bias
A systematic bias in one or another direction will create serious
problems for the group's answers. If, for example, an experimenter
"anchors" subjects on a misleading number, the median will almost
certainly be wrong. Suppose that a jar contains 800 jelly beans, and
the experimenter happens to say, quietly, "Many jars of jelly beans,
though not necessarily this one, have 500 jelly beans," or even, "I'm
asking this question to 250 people." 59 In either case, the low number
will likely operate as an anchor,6° and people's answers will be system-
atically biased toward understating the actual number, producing an
unreliable median. One study demonstrates more generally that a
group's statistical estimate is likely to be erroneous "when the mate-
rial is unfamiliar, distorted in a way such that all individuals are prone
to make similar errors of estimation." 61
Anchors have significant effects within the legal system. For
example, the plaintiff's demand is likely to affect damage awards for
harms that are difficult to monetize. Groups are no less subject to
those effects than individuals. 62 Even judges have been found to be
subject to irrelevant anchors,63 and there is every reason to believe
that multimember courts would be at least as vulnerable to them as
individual judges are.64
59 Even self-evidently arbitrary anchors have significant effects on people's judgments.
See Gretchen Chapman & Eric Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant. Anchors in Judg-
ments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS & BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 120 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
60 See id.
61 Lorge et al., supra note 36, at 346.
62 See Reid Hastie et al., Do Plaintiffs' Requests and Plaintiffs' Identities Matter?, in
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 62, 73-74 (2002).
See generally Chapman & Johnson, supra note 59.
63 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790-91
(2001) (showing effect of anchors on judicial judgments in experimental contexts).
64 See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups,
103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 689, 691-93 (1996) (noting studies showing that anchors affect
groups as well as individuals).
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2. Random or Worse
Suppose that people are asked not about the number of jelly
beans in a jar, but about the number of atoms in a jelly bean. On that
question, most people's answers are hopelessly ill-informed, and there
is no reason at all to trust their judgments. Consider a small-scale
study at the University of Chicago Law School, one that strongly sup-
ports this conclusion. A number of faculty members were asked the
weight, in pounds, of the fuel that powers space shuttles. 65 The actual
answer is four million pounds. The median response was 200,000; the
mean was 55,790,555 (because of one outlier choice)-both wildly
inaccurate. In a binary choice, of course, people's answers will be
worse than random only if they are unaware of how little they know; if
they know that they are likely to be wrong, they should choose ran-
domly, which gives them a 50% probability of being right. But some-
times people think they know more than they do, and many tasks do
not involve binary choices at all. Statistical groups will err if confusion
and ignorance are so widespread that individuals' answers are worse
than random.
Here, too, there are evident applications to many contexts in law
and politics. If, for example, members of Congress make systematic
blunders about the risks caused by certain pollutants, or if federal
judges systematically err about the competitive effects of certain prac-
tices said to violate the antitrust laws, then legislative and judicial
judgments will be erroneous even though the beliefs of numerous
people are being taken into account.
D. Statistical Answers and Experts
Should statistical means be used more frequently than they now
are? Do statistical means outperform experts? Everything depends
on the competence of the experts. If we could find real experts on
estimating the weight of oxen or on counting jelly beans, and if we
understand expertise to be the ability to make accurate assessments,
then experts would, by definition, do better than statistical means.
Suppose, for example, that a deliberating group of lawyers is trying to
decide how many Supreme Court decisions have invalidated a state or
federal law, or the number of lines in Antigone, or the weight of the
most recent winner of the Kentucky Derby. Would it make any sense
to poll the lawyers individually and to assume that the mean response
is accurate? The studies outlined above suggest that if the group is
large enough, the mean answer will be quite good, at least if group
65 Unpublished data, available from author (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
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members are not systematically biased and if they are more likely than
not to be right.6 6 But there are many ways to do far better.
If experts are available, it would make sense to obtain a statistical
answer from a group of them, rather than to select one or a few. If
experts are likely to be right, a statistical group of experts should have
the same advantage over individual experts as a statistical group of
ordinary people has over ordinary individuals. In fact a great deal of
evidence supports this claim.67 Return to the 2004 baseball predic-
tions described above; in that context, the judgments of statistical
groups were uncannily accurate. Because those judgments were per-
fect as a group, they could not possibly be inferior to that of any indi-
vidual expert.
There is more systematic evidence in this vein. In a series of
thirty comparisons, statistical groups of experts had 12.5% fewer
errors than individual experts on forecasting tasks involving such
diverse issues as company earnings, cattle and chicken prices, real and
nominal GNP, survival of patients, and housing starts.68 For example,
statistical groups of experts significantly outperformed individual
experts in predicting the annual earnings of firms, changes in the
American economy, and annual peak rainfall runoff.69 The implica-
tion is straightforward: "Organizations often call on the best expert
they can find to make important forecasts. They should avoid this
practice, and instead combine forecasts from a number of experts. 70
For political polling, it has become standard practice to combine a set
of poll results and to rely on the mean or median, rather than to select
one or two.71 The most sophisticated treatment here involves "Polly,"
a program designed to predict the results of the 2004 presidential elec-
tion.72 Polly made her predictions after combining a large set of
sources: polls, computer models, expert panels, and information mar-
66 1 conducted such a poll with faculty at the University of Chicago Law School, who
did fairly well in estimating the weight of the horse who won the Kentucky Derby, fairly
badly in estimating the number of lines in Antigone-and horrendously with the number of
Supreme Court invalidations of state and federal law! (Author's notes on file with the New
York University Law Review).
67 See Armstrong, supra note 3, at 419-20. For many factual questions, of course, a
little research would be sufficient to identify the correct answers. But for some factual
issues, even significant research is inconclusive, and it is best to consult experts.
68 Id. at 428.
69 Id. at 428, 430-31.
70 Id. at 433.
71 See, e.g., Sam Wang, Electoral College Meta-Analysis (2004) (combining predictions
and discussing rationale for doing so), at http://synapse.princeton.edu/-sam/pollcalc.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
72 See Alfred Cuzn et al., Combining Methods to Forecast the 2004 Presidential Elec-
tion: The Pollyvote 12 (Jan. 6, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York
University Law Review), available at http://www.politicalforecasting.com.
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kets. Over eight months, she continued to predict that President Bush
would receive at least 50% of the vote; her final forecast was that
President Bush would receive 51.5% of the vote, a number that was
very close to precisely right.73
Consider in this regard the Copenhagen Consensus, generated by
a group of economists in an attempt to inform policy judgments about
global risks.74 The Copenhagen Consensus emerged from an effort to
explore a series of possible interventions, involving climate change,
water and sanitation, hunger and malnutrition, free trade, and com-
municable diseases, among others. A number of experts were asked
about the best way to promote global welfare, and particularly the
welfare of developing countries, assuming that $50 billion were made
available. The experts ranked the possible projects, producing an
overall ranking (reflecting the mean rankings of the experts taken as a
whole). 75 I do not mean to suggest that the results of this particular
exercise are correct; everything depends on whether the relevant
experts were in a position to offer reliable answers on the questions at
hand. But if statistical means are a good way to aggregate knowledge
when ordinary people know something of relevance, then they are
also a good way to aggregate knowledge from experts. 76
II
DELIBERATING GROUPS
Although the judgments of statistical groups can be quite accu-
rate, it is easy to imagine that a deliberating group would be much
better. In principle, a deliberating group should do well even when its
members are error-prone. Deliberation, in the form of an exchange of
information and reasons, might well bring them into line. If many
group members give answers that are worse than random, perhaps
73 See id. at 1-2, 12. Polly's final forecast was that President Bush would take 51.5% of
the two-party vote, which was exceedingly close to the final tally. Id. at 12; see also Polit-
ical Forecasting, Polly's Page, at www.politicalforecasting.com (last updated Jan. 5, 2005)
("POLLY WAS RIGHT! Who would win in November? ... This question consumed
Polly since March, when her page was launched. She heard from many sources, including
268 polls, 10 forecasting models, three surveys ... of a select panel of American politics
experts, and the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM).").
74 See GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 1-9 (Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2004).
75 See id. at 605-08.
76 In the context of the Copenhagen Consensus, the assessment of the central ques-
tion-"the best ways of advancing global welfare"-involved normative judgments as well
as factual ones. For example, the experts ranked control of malaria above improving infant
and child nutrition, see id. at 606, but this ranking involves contentious judgments of value
as well as empirical claims. The simplest way to test the aggregation of expert judgments is
through use of prediction questions on which unambiguous evidence is available. On nor-
mative questions, see infra Part V.
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other group members can show them how they have erred. If individ-
uals have been manipulated in their private judgments, perhaps delib-
eration will undo the effects of the manipulation.77 If individual
members have anchored on a misleading value, perhaps deliberation
will expose the anchor as such.
History attests to the widespread belief that deliberation is likely
to improve individual judgments. In countless domains, both public
and private, deliberation is the preferred method for arriving at the
correct answer, even or perhaps especially when the stakes are high.
Certainly this has long been true in legislatures and on corporate
boards; it is also true for multimember panels and in academia. No
one doubts that it is possible to find numerous contexts in which delib-
erative processes appear to have done a great deal of good. The ques-
tion is whether some such processes do better than others, and
whether it is really sensible to celebrate deliberation as such and in
the abstract. I will be raising a number of doubts about such
celebrations.
To make the analysis tractable, let us focus on how deliberating
groups might be able to solve factual questions or cognitive puzzles
that have correct solutions. These questions and puzzles often involve
instrumental rationality, asking people to identify the right strategy
for achieving agreed-upon goals. Results in these domains provide a
good test of when and whether deliberating groups perform well. To
the extent that such groups do badly in answering questions with
objectively correct answers, we have reason to suspect that they will
also do badly in answering questions for which there is no consensus
on truth or validity.
A. Mechanisms and Realities
1. Possibilities
Because of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we might be tempted to
think that deliberating groups will perform extremely well. Note,
however, that one of Condorcet's key assumptions does not hold for
such groups: Members are not making their judgments indepen-
dently. Perhaps this is a virtue rather than a vice. If groups perform
better than their average member, we can imagine three principal
mechanisms by which the improvement occurs:
(1) Groups might operate in such a way as to equal the perform-
ance of their best members. One or more group members will often
know the right answer, and other group members might well become
77 See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 52-59 (emphasizing desirable effects of
deliberation).
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convinced of this fact. For this reason, groups might perform toward
or at the level of their best members. If some or many members suffer
from ignorance, or from a form of bias that leads to error, other group
members might correct them. Suppose, for example, that a panel of
judges is trying to recall relevant Supreme Court decisions in a some-
what specialized area. If one of the judges is actually aware of those
decisions, the group will be made aware of them too. Or suppose that
a group of military officials is attempting to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of a potential enemy in some part of the world. If one of
them is a specialist, all of them can learn what the specialist knows.
Many deliberating groups contain at least one expert on the question
at hand; if group members listen to the expert, they will do at least as
well as she does. For these reasons, deliberation might correct indi-
vidual errors, rather than propagating them, in a way that allows con-
vergence on the judgment of the most accurate group member.
(2) Deliberation could aggregate existing information in a way
that leads the group as a whole to know more than any individual
member does. Suppose that the group contains no experts on the
question at issue, but that relevant information is dispersed among
group members so that the group is potentially expert even if its mem-
bers are not. Or suppose that the group contains a number of experts,
but that each member is puzzled about how to solve a particular
problem. Deliberation might elicit the relevant information and allow
the group to make a sensible judgment. Almost everyone has had the
experience of being a part of a group that ended up with a solution
that went beyond what any individual member could have produced
on her own. In this process, the whole is equal to the sum of the
parts-and the sum of the parts is what is sought.
(3) The give-and-take of group discussion might sift information
and perspectives in a way that leads the group to a good solution to a
problem, one in which the whole is actually more than the sum of its
parts. In such cases, deliberation is, at the very least, an ambitious
form of information aggregation, one in which the exchange of views
leads to a creative answer or solution. And in fact, groups sometimes
do outperform their best members.78
2. Variance, Confidence, and Legitimacy
To what extent do these mechanisms work in practice? Two
points are entirely clear. First, deliberation usually reduces variance. 79
78 See Gigone & Hastie, Proper Analysis, supra note 1, at 143-53 (offering some exam-
ples of group success, while showing that such success is not typical).
79 See BROWN, supra note 22, at 206-07 (showing reduction in variance).
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After talking together, group members tend to come into accord with
one another.80 Statistical groups thus show far more diversity of
opinion than deliberating groups. Second, group members tend to
become far more confident of their judgments after they speak with
one another.8' A significant effect of group interaction is a greater
sense that one's post-deliberation conclusion is correct-whether or
not it actually is.5 2 Corroboration by others increases confidence in
one's judgments.83 It follows that members of deliberating groups will
usually converge on a position on which group members have a great
deal of confidence. This is not disturbing if that position is also likely
to be correct-but if it is not, then many group members will end up
sharing a view in which they firmly believe, but which turns out to be
wrong (a most unfortunate and sometimes quite dangerous
situation8 4).
If the purpose of deliberation is not simply to produce accurate
outcomes, then it might be especially important to know that delibera-
tion ensures less variance and higher confidence. Suppose that a key
goal of deliberation is to promote a sense of legitimacy-an under-
standing, by group members, that they have been able to participate in
the process and a belief, by all concerned, that the decision is accept-
able on its merits. Because deliberation decreases variance and
increases confidence in the outcome, it might be favored even if it
produces errors. Decreased variance and increased confidence may
well be significant and independent goods.
In fact there are complex tradeoffs among the relevant variables
here. Should we be willing to accept a little more error if that is the
price for less variance and more confidence? If deliberation signifi-
cantly increases confidence and a sense of legitimacy, then it might be
desirable even if the decision is slightly worse-at least if little turns
on slight differences in the quality of the outcome. Perhaps what most
matters is that group members accept the decision, not that the deci-
sion be correct. At least this is so if the stakes are relatively low-if it
does not greatly matter whether the group chooses course A or course
80 Id.
81 See generally Heath & Gonzalez, supra note 24 (showing increase in confidence
without increase in accuracy).
82 See RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES 176 (2d ed. 2000) ("The groups were also
more confident about the correctness of their answers, and this was true even when they
got the answers wrong!").
83 See Robert S. Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537, 538 (1996) (discussing effects of corroboration in
increasing extremism).
84 See JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 181-86 (showing that overconfidence often leads to
war-making, with disastrous results).
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B. On the other hand, an increase in legitimacy might not be so
important if the decision is leading the group into a serious blunder.
If course A is really a great deal better than course B, it is probably
worthwhile to ensure that deliberation will produce the superior
result. For many decisions, a key goal of deliberation is to improve
choices, not to legitimate whatever choice ultimately is made. And if
deliberation can improve outcomes while also increasing legitimacy,
so much the better.
3. Accuracy: A Mixed Verdict
Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence that deliberating
groups will usually succeed in aggregating the information that their
members have.85 This finding presents an extremely serious problem
for those who favor deliberation as a method for improving judg-
ments. My ultimate goal is to use this evidence to explain how delib-
erative processes should be improved; hence the goal is not to
eliminate or to reduce deliberation, but to use the mixed findings to
identify institutional reforms that will increase accuracy. Let us see
what the evidence shows.
With respect to questions with definite answers, deliberating
groups tend to do about as well as or slightly better than their average
member, but not as well as their best members.86 Hence it is false to
say that group members usually end up deferring to their internal spe-
cialists. Truth does not win out; the most that can be said is that,
under some conditions, the group will converge on the truth if the
truth begins with "at least some initial social support" within the
group when the task has "a demonstrably correct answer according to
a broadly shared normative framework (e.g., deductive logic). '' 87
Note here that when groups outperform most of their individual mem-
85 See BROWN, supra note 82, at 173-93 (describing complex results about group per-
formance); Gigone & Hastie, Proper Analysis, supra note 1, at 149, 153 (summarizing
studies as finding group judgments to be approximately equal to accuracy of mean judg-
ments of their members, and less accurate than judgments of their most accurate member);
Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 713 (finding, after canvassing of empirical literature, "no
simple empirical answer" to question of whether individuals or groups are more likely to
make biased judgments).
86 See Gigone & Hastie, Proper Analysis, supra note 1, at 153 (summarizing findings
that groups do not perform as well as best members); Reid Hastie, Review Essay: Experi-
mental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION
MAKING 129, 133-46 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1983) (same). To the
same effect, see Garold Stasser & Beth Dietz-Uhler, Collective Choice, Judgment, and
Problem Solving, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF GROUP PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP
PROCESSES 31, 49-50 (Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001) [hereinafter
GROUP PROCESSES] (collecting findings).
87 MacCoun, supra note 10, at 120.
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bers, it is generally because the issue is one on which a particular
answer can be shown, to the satisfaction of all or most, to be right; and
that even in that condition, the group might not do well if the demon-
strably correct solution lacks significant support at the outset.88 On
brainteasers and crossword puzzles, on the other hand, groups tend to
perform better than individuals, because they engage in a process of
information aggregation and mutual error correction.89 But with
respect to brainstorming problems, deliberating groups have been
found to do far less well than statistical groups, apparantly because
deliberating groups discourage novelty. 90 Hence "brainstorming is
actually most beneficial when carried out initially in private, the inter-
acting group then being used as a forum for combining and evaluating
these individually produced ideas." 91
No significant differences are found between deliberating groups
and average individual performances in numerical estimates, such as
assessment of the number of beans in a jar or the length of lines.92
One study finds that when asked to estimate the populations of
American cities, groups did as well as their most accurate individual
member;93 but this is an atypical result.94 Another study attempted to
test whether deliberating groups were particularly good at telling
whether people were telling the truth or lying.95 The individual votes,
predeliberation, were 48% correct, about the same as the post-delib-
eration judgments. Approximately the same number of people shifted
toward error as toward correct answers. Yet another study finds that
in various brainteasers, groups were better than their average
member, but not as good as their best member.96 Still other studies
find that in estimating quantities, groups do about as well as their
average member, and not as well as their best member.97
In general, simple majority schemes do fairly well at predicting
group judgments for many decisionmaking tasks. It follows that if the
88 See id.
89 See Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, supra note 86, at 35.
90 See BROWN, supra note 82, at 176.
91 Id. (emphasis in original).
92 See Hastie, supra note 86, at 133.
93 Hillel J. Einhorn et al., Quality of Group Judgment, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 158, 168
(1977).
94 See Hastie, supra note 86, at 133-46 (showing that groups do not usually perform as
well as their most accurate individual member).
95 See Harold E. Burtt, Sex Differences in the Effect of Discussion, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 390 at 390-95 (1920).
96 See Hastie, supra note 86, at 147.
97 See id. at 134-38.
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majority is wrong, the group will be wrong as well.98 With experts, the
same general conclusion holds. A "structured approach for com-
bining independent forecasts is invariably more accurate" than "tradi-
tional group meetings," which do "not use information efficiently." 99
These points raise serious doubts about the celebrations of delibera-
tive democracy offered by Habermas' ° and others, 101 simply because
those celebrations do not engage with the empirical findings, and
because the preconditions for deliberation do not provide an adequate
safeguard against errors (as we shall see). l02
Let us now turn to the key sources of deliberative failure, under-
stood as a failure to make accurate decisions on the basis of the infor-
mation that group members actually have.
B. Two Sources of Deliberative Failure: Informational Influences
and Social Pressures
A primary advantage of statistical groups is that members say
what they think. But with deliberating groups, this might not happen.
Exposure to the views of others might lead people to silence them-
selves, and for two different reasons.
1. Information
The first reason involves the informational signals provided by
the acts and views of other people. If most group members believe
that X is true, there is reason to believe that X is in fact true. That
reason might outweigh the purely private reason that a particular
group member has to believe that X is false, and hence that particular
member might simply defer. If most group members share a partic-
ular belief, isolated members, or members with a minority view, might
not speak out, respecting the informational signal given by the state-
ments of others.103
Not surprisingly, the strength of the signal will depend on the
number and nature of the people who are giving it. People are partic-
ularly averse to being the sole dissenter. If all but one person in a
deliberating group have said that X is true, then the remaining
98 See MacCoun, supra note 10, at 124 (showing that individual biases are often ampli-
fied by group interaction, not diminished).
99 Armstrong, supra note 3, at 433.
100 See HABERMAS, supra note 4, at 287-328.
101 See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 1-16; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 4, at 1-9.
102 See infra Part II.B.5 (discussing Hayekian challenge to Habermas).
103 Cf. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externali-
ties and Search, 108 ECON. J. 60, 60-61, 63 (1998) (discussing information externalities
created by behavior of other actors).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 80:962
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 984 2005
GROUP JUDGMENTS
member is likely to agree that X is true, even to the point of ignoring
the evidence of his or her own senses.104 And if the group contains
one or more people who are well known to be authorities, then other
group members are likely to defer to them.
10 5
Informational signals come in three different forms involving
conduct, conclusions, and reason-giving. First, group members might
purchase certain products, visit particular places, or engage in certain
actions; their conduct will provide a signal about their beliefs. Second,
group members might express their conclusions about some issue.
They might say that global warming is a serious problem, that crime is
rising in New York City, or that minimum wage legislation increases
unemployment. Third, group members might give reasons and argu-
ments for their beliefs, going beyond conclusions to explain why they
think as they do. If a number of different arguments favor a certain
conclusion, and if each of these arguments is plausible, there is more
reason to think that the conclusion is right.
Conduct, conclusions, and reasons will have different effects in
different circumstances. We can imagine a group whose members are
unimpressed by conclusions but much affected by behavior, or a group
whose members pay far more attention to reasons than to conclu-
sions.'0 6 By definition, the deliberative ideal is supposed to include
reason-giving, not merely actions or statements of conclusions. 10 7 The
problem is that when reasons are given, group members are likely to
pay attention to them in a way that can lead such members to fail to
say what they know. It follows that even when participants are acting
rationally and in accordance with the deliberative ideal, they might
well blunder. Indeed-and this is the central point-they blunder
because of, rather than in spite of, their rationality and their fidelity to
that ideal.
2. Social Influences
The second problem involves social influences. If people fear
that their statements will be disliked or ridiculed, they might not
speak out, even on questions of fact. Their silence might stem not
from a belief that they are wrong, as in the case of informational pres-
104 For an overview exploring social pressures on individual judgments, see Solomon E.
Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliott
Aronson ed., 7th ed. 1995).
105 See DAVID KRECH ET AL., INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 514 (1962) (showing individual
susceptibility to majority views).
106 For relevant data, see Gene Rowe & George Wright, Expert Opinions in Forecasting:
The Role of the Delphi Technique, in PRINCIPLES OF FoRECAS-IN 125, 129-30 (J. Scott
Armstrong ed., 2001).
107 See Habermas, supra note 31, at 940 (describing deliberative ideal).
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sure, but instead from the risk of social sanctions of various sorts. In
the most extreme cases, those sanctions will take the form of criminal
punishment (in societies that do not respect free speech) or complete
exclusion from the group. In less severe cases, those who defy the
dominant position will incur a form of disapproval that will lead them
to be less trusted, liked, and respected in the future. Here, too, people
are inevitably affected by the number and nature of those with the
majority position. A large majority will impose more social pressure
than a small one. If certain group members are leaders or authorities,
willing and able to impose social sanctions of various sorts, others will
be unlikely to defy them publicly. And if the group is especially cohe-
sive, social pressures will be particularly intense. Hence the robust
finding that "[h]ighly cohesive and group task-oriented groups tend to
show a number of suboptimal decision-making symptoms, including
intolerance of deviant ingroup opinions, censorship and self-censor-
ship of deviants, and ultimately rejection of deviants. '10 8
3. A Framework: Private Benefits vs. Social Benefits
Participation in deliberative processes, and the effects of informa-
tional and social influences, can be put into a more general frame-
work. Suppose that group members are deliberating about some
factual question; suppose too that each member has some information
that bears on the answer to that question. Will members disclose what
they know?
For each person, the answer may well depend on the individual
benefits and the individual costs of disclosure.109 In many situations,
and entirely apart from informational and social influences, the indi-
vidual benefits of disclosure will be far less than the social benefits. If
I say what I know about a legal issue being examined by a team of
lawyers, I will probably receive only a fraction of the benefit that
comes from an improved decision by the group. And if each group
member thinks this way, the group will receive only a fraction of the
available information. In this sense, participants in deliberation face a
standard collective action problem in which each person, following his
rational self-interest, will tell the group less than it needs to know. At
least this is so if each member receives only a small portion of the
benefits that come to the group from a good outcome-a plausible
view about the situation facing many institutions, including, for
108 See Jos6 M. Marques et al., Social Categorization, Social Identifiation, and Rejection
of Deviant Group Members, in GROUP PROCESSES, supra note 86, at 400, 403.
109 1 put altruistic motivations to one side; they bear on subsequent discussion, particu-
larly the treatment of cascades in which members are rewarded for a good decision by the
group, discussed infra Part ILE.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 80:962
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 986 2005
GROUP JUDGMENTS
example, corporate boards and administrative agencies. (Below I take
up the question whether incentives might be restructured so as to
remedy this problem, for instance by rewarding people for correct
decisions by the group. 110 )
If the statements of others suggest that privately held information
is wrong or unhelpful, then the private benefit of disclosure is reduced
even more. In that event, the group member has reason to believe
that disclosure will not improve the group's decision at all. Things are
even worse if those who speak against the apparent consensus will
suffer reputational injury (or more). In that event, the private
calculus is straightforward: Silence is golden. As we shall see, a great
deal can be done to improve the situation by realigning individual
incentives and through institutional design.
4. Findings
Both informational pressure and social influences help explain
the finding that in a deliberating group, those with a minority position
often silence themselves or otherwise have disproportionately little
weight."' There is a more particular finding: Members of groups suf-
fering from low social status-less educated people, sometimes
women-speak less and carry less influence within deliberating
groups than their higher-status peers.112 Both informational influence
and social pressures, likely to be especially strong for low-status mem-
bers, contribute to this result. The unfortunate consequence can be a
loss of information to the group as a whole, ensuring that deliberating
groups do far less well than they would if only they could aggregate
the information held by group members. If, in short, low-status mem-
bers silence themselves, groups will fail, simply because such members
often have relevant information.
Informational pressure and social pressures also help explain
some otherwise puzzling findings about judicial voting on federal
courts of appeals. Consider the fact that on three-judge panels,
Republican appointees show far more conservative voting patterns
when sitting with two other Republican appointees and that Demo-
cratic appointees show far more liberal voting patterns when sitting
110 See infra Part III.A.2.
111 See GLENN C. LOURY, SELF-CENSORSHIP IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE: A THEORY OF
"POLITICAL CORRECTNESS" AND RELATED PHENOMENA 3 (Boston Univ., Ruth Pollak
Working Paper Series on Economics, 1993).
112 See Caryn Christensen & Ann S. Abbott, Team Medical Decision Making, in DECI-
SION MAKING IN HEALTh CARE 267, 272-76 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A.
Sonnenberg eds., 2000) (discussing effects of status on exchange of information in group
interactions).
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with two other Democratic appointees.113 Consider too the finding
that, when sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic
appointees show quite conservative voting patterns, close to those of
Republican appointees in the aggregate data; and that, when sitting
with two Democratic appointees, Republican appointees are fairly lib-
eral, with overall votes akin to those of Democratic appointees.114 For
federal judges, informational pressure and social influences are not
the whole story, but they play a substantial role.115
More generally, a comprehensive study demonstrated that
majority pressures can be powerful even for factual questions on
which some people know the right answer. 1 6 The study involved 1200
people, forming groups of six, five, and four members. 117 Individuals
were asked true-false questions, involving art, poetry, public opinion,
geography, economics, and politics.118 They were then asked to
assemble into groups, which discussed the questions and produced
answers. The views of the majority played a substantial role in deter-
mining the group's answers. If a majority of individuals in the group
gave the right answer, the group's decision moved toward the majority
in 79% of the cases. 119 The truth played a role too, but a lesser one.
If a majority of individuals in the group gave the wrong answer, the
group decision nonetheless moved toward the majority position in
56% of the cases. 120 Hence the truth did have an influence-79% is
higher than 56%-but the majority's judgment was the dominant one.
And because the majority was influential even when wrong, the
average group decision was right only slightly more often than the
average individual decision (66% vs. 62%).121 What is most important
is that groups did not perform as well as they would have if they had
properly aggregated the information that group members possessed.
The same basic outcome should be larger in highly cohesive groups
with a shared sense of identity.122
113 See Sunstein, Schkade, & Ellman, supra note 23, at 314 (showing effects of panel
composition on judicial decisions).
114 See id. at 305-11.
115 See id. at 337-46.
116 Robert L. Thomdike, The Effect of Discussion Upon the Correctness of Group Deci-
sions, When the Factor of Majority Influence Is Allowed For, 9 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 343,
348-61 (1938) (exploring effects of both correctness and majority pressure on group
judgments).
117 Id. at 348.
118 Id. at 345.
119 Id. at 355.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 349.
122 See Joel Cooper et al., Attitudes, Norms, and Social Groups, in GROUP PROCESSES,
supra note 86, at 259, 260-62.
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Most ambitiously, we might think that findings of this kind help
to explain the rise of culture itself, and hence to illuminate cultural
differences among groups and nations that might not be expected to
be fundamentally different from one another.123 If individuals affect
one another, and if judgments and errors can spread from a few to
many, then seemingly small differences are likely to be magnified
through social influences. Even with respect to political issues,
involving human rights and other issues, deliberation might produce
significant cross-cultural differences as a result of variations in neigh-
bors and starting points.124 And if such differences emerge, there is
no reason for confidence that good judgments are emerging from
deliberation as such.
5. Preconditions and the Internal Morality of Deliberation: A
Hayekian Challenge to Habermas?
It is now time to engage a broader question that I have raised
throughout: Do these points amount to a challenge to deliberation as
an ideal, or to deliberative conceptions of democracy? Many of those
interested in deliberation have attempted to specify its preconditions
in a way that is intended to ensure against some of the problems that I
am emphasizing here. Jurgen Habermas, for example, stresses norms
and practices designed to allow victory by "the better argument":
Rational discourse is supposed to be public and inclusive, to grant
equal communication rights for participants, to require sincerity and
to diffuse any kind of force other than the forceless force of the
better argument. This communicative structure is expected to
create a deliberative space for the mobilization of the best available
contributions for the most relevant topics. 125
In Habermas's "ideal speech situation," all participants attempt
to seek the truth; they do not behave strategically or attempt to
decide; they accept a norm of equality. 126 Other advocates of deliber-
ative democracy have spoken similarly about what appropriate delib-
eration entails.127 On this view, deliberation, properly understood,
does not simply involve the exchange of words and opinions. It
123 See Bibb Latand & Martin J. Bourgeois, Dynamic Social Impact and the Consolida-
tion, Clustering, Correlation, and Continuing Diversity of Culture, in GROUP PROCESSES,
supra note 86, at 235, 237-51.
124 Id. at 243-46.
125 See Habermas, supra note 31, at 940.
126 See JORGEN HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1, 2-4, 32 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979) (discussing pre-
conditions for communication).
127 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 7-8 (outlining foundations of authors'
vision of deliberative democracy).
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imposes its own requirements and preconditions. Indeed, deliberation
has its own internal morality, one that operates as a corrective to some
of the effects of deliberative processes in the real world.
These claims point in helpful directions. It is correct to say that
deliberation, properly understood, contains an internal morality that
can be invoked to challenge nominally deliberative processes.
Habermas's preconditions will certainly make the situation better
rather than worse, and better than it frequently is in real-world delib-
erative settings.
Unfortunately, preconditions of the sort identified by Habermas
will cure few of the problems that I shall outline here. More particu-
larly, those preconditions will do little to affect the four key failures
on the part of deliberating groups. Each of the failures is likely to
arise even if discourse is public and inclusive, even if participants are
sincere, and even if everyone has equal communication rights. We
might therefore take the argument to follow as a Hayekian critique of
Habermas-a critique, that stresses (with Hayek) the diffusion of
information in society and the difficulty of aggregating that informa-
tion through deliberation (as opposed to the price signal). 128 As we
shall see, some of the relevant problems are reduced if various forms
of subtle "force" are eliminated. But the reduction is only partial.
The four problems have distinctive structures; I discuss them in
sequence.
C. Deliberative Failure 1: Amplification of Cognitive Errors
It is well known that individuals do not always process informa-
tion well. They use heuristics that lead them to predictable errors;
they are also subject to identifiable biases, which produce errors. 129 A
growing literature explores the role of these heuristics and biases and
their relationship to law and policy. For example, most people follow
the representativeness heuristic, in accordance with which judgments
of probability are influenced by assessments of resemblance (the
extent to which A "looks like" B).130 The representative heuristic
helps explain what Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff call "sympathetic
magical thinking," including the beliefs that some objects have conta-
128 See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945) (discussing dispersal of knowledge and its aggregation through markets).
129 For an overview, see generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTU-
rriVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). See also BEHAVIORAL LAW & Eco-
NOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
130 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 129, at 19, 22-25 (discussing representative
conjunctions).
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gious properties and that causes resemble their effects.' 3 ' The repre-
sentativeness heuristic often works well, but it can also lead to severe
blunders.
People also err because they use the availability heuristic to
answer difficult questions about probability. When people use this
heuristic, they answer a question of probability by asking whether
examples come readily to mind. 132 In addition, most people are strik-
ingly vulnerable to framing effects, making different decisions
depending on the wording of the problem. For a simple example, con-
sider the question whether to undergo a risky medical procedure.
When people are told, "Of those who have this procedure, 90% are
alive after five years," they are far more likely to agree to the proce-
dure than when they are told, "Of those who have this procedure,
10% are dead after five years. '"133
For purposes of assessing deliberation, a central question is
whether groups avoid the errors of the individuals who compose them.
There is no clear evidence that they do, and there is considerable evi-
dence that they do not-a vivid illustration of the principle, "garbage
in, garbage out," in a way that mocks the aspiration to collective cor-
rection of individual blunders. In fact individual errors are not merely
replicated but actually amplified in group decisions-a process of
"some garbage in, much garbage out." The most general finding is
that when a bias is widely shared, group interactions will actually
enhance its effect.134
Consider some particular findings. If individual jurors are biased
because of pretrial publicity that misleadingly implicates the defen-
dant, or even because of the defendant's unappealing physical appear-
ance, juries as a group are likely to amplify rather than to correct
those biases.135 Groups have been found to amplify, rather than to
attenuate, reliance on the representativeness heuristic; 136 to fall prey
131 Paul Rozin & Carol Nemeroff, Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and
Similarity "Heuristics," in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT, supra note 129, at 201-16 (exploring perceptions involving contagion).
132 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic For Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) (discussing availability
heuristic).
133 See Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive and
Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993) (discussing framing effects in medical
context).
134 See Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, supra note 86, at 49-50. Note that when the bias is not
widely shared, it may be corrected through deliberation. See id.
135 MacCoun, supra note 10, at 121-26 (showing amplification of jury bias).
136 Mark F. Stasson et al., Group Consensus Approaches on Cognitive Bias Tasks: A
Social Decision Scheme Approach, 30 JAPANESE PSYCHOL. RES. 68, 74-75 (1988).
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to even larger framing effects than individuals; 137 to show more over-
confidence than group members; 138 to be more affected by the biasing
effect of spurious arguments from lawyers;139 to be more susceptible
to the "sunk cost fallacy"; 140 and to be more subject to choice-rank
preference reversals. 14' In an especially revealing finding, groups
have been found to make more, rather than fewer, conjunction errors
(believing that A and B are more likely to be true than A alone) than
individuals when individual error rates are high-though fewer when
individual error rates are low. 142 In addition, groups demonstrate only
a marginally decreased level of reliance on the availability heuristic,
even when use of that heuristic leads to clear errors.143 In a particu-
larly disturbing finding, it is shown that groups are more likely than
individuals to escalate their commitment to a course of action that is
failing, and all the more so if members identify strongly with the
groups of which they are a part.'"
Why are individual cognitive errors propagated and often ampli-
fied at the group level? Informational pressures and social influences
are unquestionably at work. Suppose, for example, that most mem-
bers of a group are prone to make conjunction errors.145 If the
majority makes conjunction errors, then most people will see others
making conjunction errors, and what they see will convey information
about what is right. Those who are not specialists in logic are likely to
think: If most people make conjunction errors, perhaps they are not
errors at all. Of course some people will not fall prey to those errors
137 See Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 693, 711-12.
138 See id. at 692 tbl.l (noting study that found groups generally more confident than
individuals); Janet A. Sniezek & Rebecca A. Henry, Accuracy and Confidence in Group
Judgment, 42 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 24-27 (1989).
This finding very much bears on excessive risk-taking, including in the context of making
war. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 25.
139 See Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 691.
140 The sunk cost fallacy ("throwing good money after bad") emerges when people
reason, after making a bad investment: I shouldn't stop now, because if I do, I will lose
what I have already paid out. On the sunk cost fallacy within groups, see generally Glen
Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect
Theory Approach, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430
(1993).
141 See John C. Mowen & James W. Gentry, Investigation of the Preference-Reversal
Phenomenon in a New Product Introduction Task, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 715, 721 (1980).
But see Julie R. Irwin & James H. Davis, Choice/Matching Preference Reversals in Groups:
Consensus Processes and Justification Based Reasoning, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECaSION PROCESSES 325, 337 (1995) (finding preference reversals to have been
moderated by group discussion).
142 Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 692 (citing studies).
143 Id.
144 Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, supra note 86, at 48.
145 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 130, at 26.
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and may even correct them; but group members would have to have a
high degree of confidence to do so. Recall here the finding that
groups make more conjunction errors than individuals when the initial
rate of individual error is high146-a finding that fits well with the
informational explanation of why groups amplify errors.
Social influences also contribute to the propagation and amplifi-
cation of individual mistakes. If most group members make conjunc-
tion errors, others also might make them simply in order not to seem
disagreeable or foolish-at least if there is no particular incentive to
produce the right answer. And if most group members use the availa-
bility heuristic, or commit the sunk-cost fallacy, then there will be
social pressure for the other members to do the same.
To be sure, there is some evidence of group attenuation of certain
biases. For example, groups are slightly less susceptible to hindsight
bias. 147 Apparently members who are not susceptible to that bias are
able to persuade others that it is indeed a bias. Groups are especially
likely to outperform the average individual when members are subject
to "egocentric biases."'1 48 When asked what percentage of other
undergraduates will vote for a particular candidate, have cell phones,
watch television on Tuesday night, enjoy a particular singer, or believe
that the latest Spiderman movie will win at least one Oscar, most
people show a bias in the direction that they themselves favor. They
believe that their tastes and preferences are typical. But in groups
with diverse views, individual members learn that their own position is
not universally held, and hence the bias is reduced. 149 In these cases,
group deliberation supplies an important corrective.
But the broader point is that, with group discussion, individual
errors are usually propagated, not eliminated, 150 and amplification of
mistakes is as likely as alleviation. A general review suggests that
when individuals show a high degree of bias, groups are likely to be
more biased, not less biased, than their median or average member; in
such circumstances, "groups generally can be expected to amplify
rather than correct individual bias.' 15' This point is an application of
the lesson, from the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that as the size of the
group expands, the likelihood of group error expands toward 100% if
146 See Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 692.
147 See generally Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in
Groups, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46 (1995).
148 Personal communication with Reid Hastie, University of Chicago Business School
(July 24, 2004), who has conducted experiments on this issue for many years.
149 Id.
150 See Bottom et al., supra note 52, at 160.
151 MacCoun, supra note 10, at 124 (emphasis omitted).
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each group member is more likely to be wrong than right. What I am
emphasizing here is that social dynamics can aggravate rather than
reduce that problem. And if this is so, then jury deliberations, as well
as deliberation within multimember courts and the executive branch,
will be prone to error. Recall here the suggestion that both the CIA
and NASA blundered because group processes failed to correct, and
instead amplified, initial biases internal to both agencies. 152
D. Deliberative Failure 2: Hidden Profiles and
Common Knowledge
Suppose that group members have a great deal of information-
enough to produce the unambiguously correct outcome if that infor-
mation is properly aggregated. Even if this is so, an obvious problem
is that groups will not perform well if they emphasize shared informa-
tion and slight information that is held by only one or a few members.
Unfortunately, countless studies demonstrate that this unfortunate
result is highly likely.153 "Hidden profiles" is the term for accurate
understandings that groups could obtain but do not. Hidden profiles
are in turn a product of the "common knowledge effect," through
which information held by all group members has more influence on
group judgments than information held by only a few members.154
The most obvious explanation of the effect is the simple fact that, as a
statistical matter, common knowledge is more likely to be communi-
cated to the group; but social influences play a role as well.
1. Examples
Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both
face-to-face and online. 155 The purpose of the study was to see how
groups might collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for
three candidates applying for a marketing manager position were
placed before group members. 156 The attributes of the candidates
were manipulated by the experimenters so that one applicant was
clearly the best candidate for the job described. Packets of informa-
tion were given to subjects, each containing a subset of information
152 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
153 See Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 304, 306-13 (2003) (discussing
hidden profile experiments).
154 Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing
and Group Judgments, 65 J. PERSONALIrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 959, 971-73 (1993) [herein-
after Gigone & Hastie, Common Knowledge Effect] (explaining hidden profiles by refer-
ence to common knowledge effect).
155 See Ross Hightower & Lutfus Sayeed, The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communi-
cation Systems on Biased Group Discussion, 11 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 33, 43 (1995).
156 Id. at 39.
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from the resumes, so that. each group member had only part of the
relevant information. The groups consisted of three people, some
operating face-to-face, some operating online. Almost none of the
deliberating groups made what was conspicuously the right choice. 157
The reason is simple: Members failed to share information in a way
that would permit the group to make that choice. People were
inclined to share positive information about the winning candidate
and negative information about the losers. They suppressed negative
information about the winner and positive information about the
losers. Hence their statements served to "reinforce the march toward
group consensus rather than add complications and fuel debate."'1 58
Or consider a simulation of political elections, in which informa-
tion was parceled out to individual members about three candidates
for political office, and in which properly pooled information could
have led to the selection of Candidate A, who was clearly the best
choice. 159 In the first condition, each member of the four-person
group was given most of the relevant information (66% of the infor-
mation about each candidate). In that condition, 67% of group mem-
bers favored Candidate A before discussion, and 85% after
discussion. 160 This is a clear example of appropriate aggregation of
information. Groups significantly outperformed individuals, appar-
ently because of the exchange of information and reasons. Here,
then, is a clear illustration of the possibility that groups can aggregate
what members know in a way that produces sensible outcomes.
In the second condition, by contrast, the information that favored
Candidate A was parceled out to various members of the group, so
that only 33% of information about each candidate was shared, and
67% was unshared. As the condition was designed, the shared infor-
mation favored two unambiguously inferior candidates, B and C.161 If
the unshared information emerged through discussion, and was taken
seriously, Candidate A would be chosen. In that condition, less than
25% of group members favored Candidate A before discussion, a nat-
ural product of the initial distribution of information. But (and this is
the key result) the number favoring Candidate A actually fell after
discussion, simply because the shared information had dispropor-
157 Id. at 40.
158 PATRICIA WALLACE, TiH PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 82 (1999).
159 See Garold Stasser & William Titus, Pooling of Unshared Information in Group
Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion, 48 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1467, 1471-72 (1985) [hereinafter Stasser & Titus, Pooling].
160 Id. at 1473; see also Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 304.
161 Stasser & Titus, Pooling, supra note 159, at 1471-72.
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tionate influence on group members. 162 In other words, groups did
worse, not better, than individuals when the key information was dis-
tributed selectively. In those conditions, the commonly held informa-
tion was far more influential than the unshared information, to the
detriment of the group's ultimate decision.
From this and many similar studies, the general conclusion is that
when "the balance of unshared information opposes the initially most
popular position.... the unshared information will tend to be omitted
from discussion and, therefore, will have little effect on members'
preferences during group discussion."'163 That conclusion has a clear
connection with the judgments, mentioned above, about large-scale
information failures at the CIA and similar failures at NASA.164 It
follows that "[g]roup decisions and postgroup preferences reflect[]
the initial preferences of group members even when the exchange of
unshared information should have resulted in substantial shifts in
opinion."'1 65 Nor does discussion increase the recall of unshared infor-
mation. Instead, its major effect is to increase recall of the attributes
of the initially most popular candidate. 166 The most disturbing conclu-
sion is that when key information is unshared, groups are "more likely
to endorse an inferior option after discussion than.., their individual
members before discussion.' '1 67
2. The Common Knowledge Effect
These results are best understood as a consequence of the
"common knowledge effect," by which information held by all group
members has the most substantial influence on group judgments, far
more than information held by one member or a few.168 More pre-
cisely, the "influence of a particular item of information is directly and
positively related to the number of group members who have knowl-
edge of that item before the group discussion and judgment."169
Under conditions of unshared information, group judgments have
been found to be "not any more accurate than the average of the indi-
vidual judgments, even though"-and this is the central point-"the
162 Id. at 1473 tbl.3.
163 Id. at 1476.
164 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
165 Stasser & Titus, Pooling, supra note 159, at 1476.
166 Id.
167 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 305.
168 See Gigone & Hastie, Common Knowledge Effect, supra note 154, at 959 (describing
experiment showing common knowledge effect in groups of three).
169 Id. at 960.
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groups were in possession of more information than were any of the
individuals.' u7 0
In a key study, deliberating groups would have lost nothing in
terms of accuracy if they had simply averaged the judgments of the
people involved-a clear finding that deliberation may not improve
on the judgments of statistical groups. 17 1 The more shared informa-
tion is (that is, the more that it stands as "common knowledge"), the
more impact it will have on group members before discussion
begins-and the more impact it will have as discussion proceeds, pre-
cisely because commonly held information is more likely to be
discussed.
As might be expected, the group's focus on shared information
increases with the size of the group. 172 In another study designed to
test judgments about candidates for office, involving both three-
person and six-person groups, all discussions focused far more on
shared information than on unshared information-but the effect was
significantly greater for six-person groups. Most remarkably, "it was
almost as likely for a shared item to be mentioned twice as it was for
an unshared item to be mentioned at all.' 73 And despite the failures
of their deliberations, group members were significantly more confi-
dent in their judgments after discussion. 174
How can these findings be squared with the Condorcet Jury The-
orem? The most fundamental point is that in deliberation, individuals
are not making judgments on their own; they are being influenced by
the judgments of others. When interdependent judgments are being
made, and when some people are wrong, the Condorcet Jury Theorem
offers no clear predictions. Under such circumstances, it is not at all
clear that groups will reach better conclusions than individuals.
175
And when groups fail, the tendency toward hidden profiles is often
part of the reason.
170 Id. at 973.
171 Id.
172 See Garold Stasser et al., Information Sampling in Structured and Unstructured Dis-
cussions of Three- and Six-Person Groups, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 67, 72-73
(1989).
173 Id. at 78.
174 Id. at 72.
175 See generally Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 714 (predicting enhanced bias by groups
facing "many real-world decision tasks" and listing as examples, "jury decision making,
hiring decisions, risky investment decisions" and certain foreign policy decisions). On some
of the theoretical issues, see David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggrega-
tion, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 34 (1996).
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3. Informational Influences and Social Pressures Redux
Why do hidden profiles remain hidden? The two major explana-
tions track the informational and social accounts traced above. When
information is held by all or most group members, it is especially
likely, as a statistical matter, to be repeated in group discussion, and
hence more likely to be influential than information that is held by
one person or a few.176 There are two different points here. First,
information held by all or most group members is likely to influence
individual judgments, and those judgments will affect the judgments
of the group. 177 Thus the effects of a shared piece of information will
influence the group simply through its impact on predeliberation judg-
ments. Second, shared information, because it is shared, is more likely
to be explored during group discussion. 178
Suppose, for example, that a team of five lawyers is deciding
whether to appeal an adverse trial court ruling. If each of the five
lawyers has information indicating that an appeal would be unsuc-
cessful, that information is more likely to emerge in group discussion
than separate parcels of information, individually held by each lawyer,
suggesting that an appeal would succeed. If the team of lawyers
stresses the information that is antecedently held by each, that infor-
mation will have a disproportionate influence on its ultimate deci-
sion. 179 This is a statistical point about information sampling.
But information sampling provides an incomplete account;
hidden profiles remain even more hidden than would be predicted by
that account. 180 To understand the additional element, consider the
finding that low-status members of groups are "increasingly reluctant
over the course of discussion to repeat unique information."',' Those
in a group who are inexperienced, or are thought to be low on the
hierarchy, are particularly loathe to emphasize their privately held
information as discussion proceeds. This finding suggests that group
members, and especially lower status ones, are alert to the reputa-
tional costs of emphasizing information that most group members
seem to lack. Lower status members "are likely to drop unique infor-
mation like a hot potato"-partly because of the difficulty of estab-
lishing its credibility and relevance, and partly because they may incur
group disapproval if they press a line of argument that others reject.182
176 See Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 306-07.
177 See Gigone & Hastie, Common Knowledge Effect, supra note 154, at 960.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 308.
181 ld.
182 Id.
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With respect to the risk of error, consider the finding that group mem-
bers underestimate the performance of low-status members and over-
estimate the performance of high-status members, in a way that gives
high-status members a degree of deference that is not warranted by
reality.'l 3 It follows that hidden profiles are produced by both infor-
mational and reputational pressures imposed by the initial distribution
of views.
In the same vein, those who discuss shared information obtain
rewards in the form of an enhanced sense of competence and standing
in the eyes of others-and in their own eyes as well. 184 In both face-
to-face discussions and purely written tasks, people give higher ratings
(in terms of knowledge, competence, and credibility) to themselves
and to others after receiving information that they knew already. It
follows that "a bearer of valuable, unshared information may need to
establish credibility by telling others what they already know before
telling them what they do not already know." 18 5 The general problem
is that deliberating groups often perform poorly because they fail to
elicit information that could steer them in the right directions.
E. Deliberative Failure 3: Cascades
1. Informational Cascades
Hidden profiles are closely related to informational cascades,
which greatly impair group judgments. Cascades need not involve
deliberation, but deliberative processes often involve cascades. As in
the case of hidden profiles, the central point is that those involved in a
cascade do not reveal what they know. As a result, the group does not
obtain important information.
To see how informational cascades work, imagine a deliberating
jury that is deciding whether a defendant should be subject to a puni-
tive damage award and, if so, in what amount. 86 Let us also assume
that the jurors are announcing their views in sequence, in a temporal
queue, and that each juror knows his place on that queue. From his
own recollection of the evidence and the jury instructions, and from
183 Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Social Status and Group Structure, in GROUP PROCESSES, supra
note 86, at 352, 354 (collecting studies).
184 See Gwen M. Wittenbaum et al., Mutual Enhancement: Toward an Understanding of
the Collective Preference for Shared Information, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 967,
967-78 (1999).
185 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 311.
186 I draw here on David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence,
Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188,
193-95 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995), and on the discussion in
SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 55-73 (2003).
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some personal experience, each juror has some private information
about what should be done. But each juror also attends, reasonably
enough, to the judgments of others. Andrews is the first to speak. He
suggests that the defendant should be subject to a punitive award and
a high one-say, $5 million. Barnes now knows Andrews's judgment;
it is clear that she too should certainly urge a punitive award, and a
high one, if she agrees independently with Andrews. But if her
independent judgment is that no award should be imposed, she
would-if she trusts Andrews no more and no less than she trusts her-
self-be indifferent about what to do, and might simply flip a coin.
Now turn to a third juror, Carlton. Suppose that both Andrews
and Barnes have favored a punitive award, and a multimillion dollar
one, but that Carlton's own information, though inconclusive, suggests
that no award should be imposed. In that event, Carlton might well
ignore what he knows and follow Andrews and Barnes. It is likely, in
these circumstances, that both Andrews and Barnes had reasons for
their conclusion, and unless Carlton thinks that his own information is
better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does, Carlton is in
a cascade. Now suppose that Carlton is acting in response to what
Andrews and Barnes did, not on the basis of his own information, and
also that subsequent jurors know what Andrews, Barnes, and Carlton
did. On reasonable assumptions, they will do exactly what Carlton
did: favor a high punitive damage award regardless of their private
information (which, we are supposing, is relevant but inconclusive).
This will happen even if Andrews initially blundered. 187
If this is what is happening, there is a serious social problem:
Jurors who are in the cascade do not disclose the information that
they privately hold. In the example just given, jury decisions will not
reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of those on
the jury-even if the information held by individual jurors, if actually
revealed and aggregated, would produce a quite different result. The
reason for the problem is that individual jurors are following the lead
of those who came before. Subsequent jurors might fail to rely on,
and fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the infor-
mation collectively held by those who started the cascade.
Cascades often occur in the real world within deliberating groups
and in other situations;188 they are easy to create in the laboratory as
well. The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the
experiment used Urn A, which contained two white balls and one
187 See generally Hirshleifer, supra note 186, at 193-95.
188 See id. at 200-07 (discussing real world examples of cascades); see also SUNSTEIN,
supra note 21, at 54-95 (discussing cascades).
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dark, or Urn B, which contained two dark balls and one white. 189
Subjects could earn $2 for a correct decision, and hence an economic
incentive favored correct individual decisions (a point to which I will
return). In each round, the contents of the chosen urn were emptied
into a container. A randomly selected subject was asked to make one
(and only one) private draw of a ball. After that draw, the subject
recorded, on an answer sheet, the color of the draw and her own deci-
sion about which urn was involved. The subject did not announce her
draw to the group, but she did announce her own decision to eve-
ryone. Then the urn was passed to the next subject for her own pri-
vate draw, which again was not disclosed, and for her own decision
about the urn, which again was disclosed. 190 This process continued
until all subjects had made draws and decisions. At that time the
experimenter announced the actual urn used. If the subject picks the
urn based only on her private information, she will be right 66.7% of
the time. The point of the experiment is to see whether people will
decide to ignore their own draw in the face of conflicting announce-
ments by predecessors-and to explore whether such decisions will
lead to cascades and errors.
In the experiment, cascades often developed, and they often pro-
duced errors. After a number of individual judgments were revealed,
people sometimes announced decisions that were inconsistent with
their private draws, but that fit with the majority of previous
announcements. Over 71% of "rounds" resulted in cascades. 91 Con-
sider cases in which one person's draw (say, white ball) contradicted
the announcement of his predecessor (say, Urn B). A study that repli-
cated the urn experiment found that the second announcement none-
theless matched the first about 11% of the time-far less than a
majority, but enough to ensure cascades. 192 And when one person's
draw contradicted the announcement of two or more predecessors,
the second announcement was likely to follow those who went before.
Notably, the majority of decisions were rationally based on the avail-
able information' 93-but erroneous cascades nonetheless developed.
189 See Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory,
87 AM. ECON. REV. 847, 849-53, 860 (1997) (exploring experimental evidence of cascades).
190 Id. at 851.
191 Id. at 859.
192 Angela A. Hung & Charles R. Plott, Information Cascades: Replication and an
Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions, 91 AM. ECON. REV.
1508, 1518 (2001).
193 See Anderson & Holt, supra note 189, at 853. A majority of subjects also rationally
followed available information in Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, Are More
Informed Agents Able to Shatter Information Cascades in the Lab, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NETWORKS: INTERACTION & BEHAVIOURS 291, 304 (Patrick Cohendet et al. eds., 1998).
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Here is an actual example of a cascade producing an inaccurate out-
come (the urn used was B):194
TABLE 1: AN INFORMATIONAL CASCADE
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private Draw A A B B B B
Decision A A A A A A
What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of
private information-four darks and two whites-justified the correct
judgment, which was in favor of Urn B. But the existence of two early
signals, producing rational but incorrect judgments, led everyone else
to fall in line. "[I]nitial misrepresentative signals start a chain of
incorrect decisions that is not broken by more representative signals
received later."'1 95 This result maps directly onto real-world decisions
by deliberating groups, in which people fail to disclose what they
know, to the detriment of the group as a whole. As a possible
example, consider the existence of widely divergent group judgments
about the origins and causes of AIDS, with some groups believing,
falsely, that the first cases were observed in Africa as a result of sexual
relations with monkeys, and with other groups believing, also falsely,
that the virus was produced in government laboratories. 196 These and
other views about AIDS are a product of social interactions and in
particular of cascade effects.
2. Reputational Cascades
In a reputational cascade, people think that they know what is
right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with
the crowd in order to maintain the good opinion of others. Suppose
that Albert suggests that global warming is a serious problem, and
that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually thinks that
Albert is right, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be
ignorant or indifferent to environmental protection. If Albert and
Barbara seem to agree that global warming is a serious problem,
Cynthia might not contradict them publicly and might even appear to
share their judgment, not because she believes that judgment to be
correct, but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose
their good opinion.
194 See Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, supra note 193, at 291.
195 Anderson & Holt, supra note 189, at 859.
196 See Fabio Lorenzi-Cioldi & Alain C1mence, Group Processes and the Construction
of Social Representations, in GRouP PROCESSES, supra note 86, at 311, 315-17.
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It should be easy to see how this process might generate a cas-
cade. Once Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the
issue, their friend David might be most reluctant to contradict them
even if he thinks that they are wrong. The apparent views of Albert,
Barbara, and Cynthia carry information; that apparent view might be
right. But even if David thinks that they are wrong and has informa-
tion supporting that conclusion, he might be most reluctant to take
them on publicly. In the actual world of group decisions, people are
of course uncertain whether publicly expressed statements are a
product of independent knowledge, participation in an informational
cascade, or reputational pressure. Much of the time, listeners and
observers probably overstate the extent to which the actions of others
are based on independent information.
The possibility of reputational cascades is demonstrated by an
ingenious variation on the urn experiment described above. 197 In this
experiment, people were paid twenty-five cents for a correct decision,
but seventy-five cents for a decision that matched the decision of the
majority of the group. There were punishments for incorrect and non-
conforming answers as well. If people made an incorrect decision,
they lost twenty-five cents; if their decision failed to match the group's
decision, they lost seventy-five cents.198
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No
fewer than 96.7% of rounds resulted in cascades, and 35.3% of
people's announcements did not match their private signal, that is, the
signal given by their own draw. 199 And when the draw of a subse-
quent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor,
72.2% of people matched the first announcement. 200 Consider, as a
dramatic illustration, this round of the experiment 20 1 (the actual urn
for this round was B):
TABLE 2: CONFORMITY AND CASCADES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Private Draw A B B B A B B B A B
Decision A A A A A A A A A A
197 See Hung & Plott, supra note 192, at 1511-12 (offering variations on urn
experiment).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1517-18.
200 Id. at 1518.
201 Id. at 1516 (conformity-rewarding model, experiment 4, period 10).
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This experiment shows that especially unfortunate results should
be expected if people are rewarded not only or not mostly for being
correct, but also or mostly for doing what other people do.
F. Deliberative Failure 4: Group Polarization
There are clear links among hidden profiles, social cascades, and
the well-established phenomenon of group polarization, by which
members of a deliberating group end up in a more extreme position in
line with their tendencies before deliberation began .202 Group polariza-
tion is the typical pattern with deliberating groups. It has been found
in hundreds of studies involving over a dozen countries. 20 3 For
example, those who disapprove of the United States, and are suspi-
cious of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and suspicion if
they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of this
phenomenon among citizens of France.2°4
Group polarization occurs for issues of fact as well as issues of
value, though it is easier to demonstrate for the latter.20 5 Group
polarization has been found on obscure factual questions, such as how
far Sodom (on the Dead Sea) is below sea level.20 6 But if the question
is whether a terrorist attack will occur in the United States in the next
year, group polarization will not be easy to test, simply because the
answer is either yes or no, and it is not simple to demonstrate greater
extremism in binary choices. But suppose that people are asked, on a
bounded scale of zero to eight, how likely it is that a terrorist attack
will occur in the United States in the next year, with zero indicating
"zero probability," eight indicating "absolutely certain," seven indi-
cating, "overwhelmingly likely," six "more probable than not," and
five "fifty-fifty." In that event, the answers from a deliberating group
will tend to reveal group polarization, as people move toward more
extreme points on the scale, depending on their initial median point.
If the predeliberation median is six, the group judgment will usually
be seven; if the predeliberation median is three, the group judgment
will usually be two. 20 7 Recall here that federal judges are highly sus-
ceptible to group polarization, as both Democratic and Republican
appointees show far more ideological voting patterns when sitting
202 See BROWN, supra note 22, at 202-26.
203 See id. at 204.
204 Id. at 223-24.
205 See JOHN C. TURNER, REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZA-
TION THEORY 152-53 (1987).
206 Id.
207 See BROWN, supra note 22, at 222-24.
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with other judges appointed by a president of the same political
party.208 Juries polarize as well. 20 9
Why does group polarization occur? There are three reasons.210
The first and most important involves the now-familiar idea of infor-
mational influence, but in a distinctive form. People respond to the
arguments made by other people-and the "argument pool," in any
group with some predisposition in one direction, will inevitably be
skewed toward that predisposition. As a statistical matter, the argu-
ments favoring the initial position will be more numerous than the
arguments pointing in the other direction. Individuals will have heard
of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from group deliber-
ation. As a result of the relevant arguments, deliberation will lead
people toward a more extreme point in line with what group members
initially believed.
The second explanation involves social influences. 211 People
want to be perceived favorably by other group members. Sometimes
people's publicly stated views are, to a greater or lesser extent, a func-
tion of how they want to present themselves. Once they hear what
others believe, some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the
direction of the dominant position, to present themselves in the way
that they prefer.212
The third explanation stresses that people with extreme views
tend to have more confidence that they are right, and that as people
gain confidence, they become more extreme in their beliefs.213 In a
wide variety of experimental contexts, people's opinions have been
shown to become more extreme simply because their views have been
corroborated, and because they have become more confident after
learning of the shared views of others. 214
A great deal of work suggests that group polarization is height-
ened when members have a sense of shared identity, and this point is
sometimes used to suggest an independent explanation of polariza-
208 See Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 23, at 305 (showing group polarization
within court of appeals panels).
209 See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1139, 1140-41 (2000) (showing group polarization with mock juries).
210 See BROWN, supra note 22, at 212-22, 226-45; Baron et al., supra note 83, at 540.
211 BROWN, supra note 22, at 233-39.
212 Id. at 213-17. It similarly has been suggested that majorities are especially potent
because people do not want to incur the wrath, or lose the favor, of large numbers of
people, and that when minorities have influence, it is because they produce genuine attitu-
dinal change. See Baron et al., supra note 83, at 550, 557-59.
213 See Baron et al., supra note 83, at 557-59 (showing that corroboration increases con-
fidence and hence extremism).
214 Id. at 541, 546-47, 557 (concluding that corroboration of one's views has effects on
opinion extremity).
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tion, involving intergroup differentiation.215 People may polarize
because they are attempting to conform to the position that they see
as typical within their own group; if in-group identity is especially
salient or important, the in-group norms "are likely to become more
extreme so as to be more clearly differentiated from outgroup norms,
and the within-group polarization will be enhanced. 2 16 When
Democrats or Republicans become polarized, or when polarization
occurs within religious or ethnic groups, intergroup differentiation is
likely to be a major reason. And if arguments come from a member
of an in-group, they are especially likely to be persuasive, and it is
reasonable to think that people would fear the reputational sanctions
that come from rejecting what an in-group member has to say. By
contrast, the views of out-group.members have less force.21 7 The clear
lesson is that when a group is highly cohesive, and when members are
closely identified with it, polarization is especially likely and likely to
be especially large.
Does group polarization lead to accurate or inaccurate answers?
Do deliberating groups err when they polarize? No general answer
would make sense. Everything depends on the relationship between
the correct answer and the group's predeliberation tendencies. But as
a result of the relevant influences, some people will fail to disclose
what they know. Deliberative processes might well fail to move
people in the right directions. When individuals are leaning in a direc-
tion that is mistaken, the mistake will be amplified by group delibera-
tion. We have already encountered an example: When most people
are prone to make conjunction errors, group processes lead to more
errors rather than fewer.218 The same is true when jury members are
biased as a result of pretrial publicity; here the jury as a group
becomes more biased than individual jurors were. 219 This is polariza-
tion in action, and it produces major blunders.
G. Deliberative Success?
Thus far I have emphasized several reasons why deliberation
often fails to improve on the judgments of statistical groups, and
indeed might make those judgments even worse. But there is some
intriguing countervailing evidence.
215 See BROWN, supra note 82, at 209-11; TURNER, supra note 205, at 159-70; Joel
Cooper et al., supra note 122, at 259, 269-70.
216 BROWN, supra note 82, at 210.
217 Id. at 211; Cooper et al., supra note 122, at 269.
218 See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
219 See MacCoun, supra note 10, at 127-28.
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1. Increases in Accuracy
When one or more people in a group are confident that they
know the right answer to a factual question, the group might be
expected to shift in the direction of accuracy. 220 And if the question
has a readily demonstrable answer, it is more likely that groups will
converge on it.221 For problems with answers that are self-affirming,
or that are clearly right once stated, a single correct member usually
ensures a correct answer from the group.222 Suppose that the question
is how many people were on the earth in 1940, or the number of
Supreme Court decisions invalidating acts of Congress, or the distance
between Paris and London. Suppose too that one or a few people
know the right answer. If so, there is a good chance that the group
will not polarize, but instead accept that answer. 223
When this is so, the reason is simple: The person who is confident
that she knows the answer will speak with assurance and authority,
and she is likely to be convincing for that very reason. An early study
finds that those with correct answers are usually more confident, and
hence confidence was "associated with correctness for both individual
and group performance. ' 22 4 Consider in this light the finding that
pairs tend to do better than individuals on a test involving general
vocabulary knowledge; those pairs with at least one high-ability
member generally performed at the same level as their more compe-
tent member. 225
Some evidence suggests that while deliberating groups often fail
to spread information, they are less likely to neglect unshared infor-
mation if they believe that there is a demonstrably correct answer to
the question that they are trying to answer.226 Asked to solve a
murder mystery, a deliberating group did far better when its members
were told that they had sufficient clues to "determine" the identity of
the guilty suspect than when they were told to decide which suspect
was "most likely to have committed the crime. ' 227 Hence "adequate
220 See James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic
Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A HuMAN FACE 3, 29-31 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy
Reynolds eds., 1999) (suggesting that deliberation can produce accurate judgments).
221 See Gigone & Hastie, Proper Analysis, supra note 1, at 165.
222 Stasser & Dietz-Uhler, supra note 86, at 40.
223 See Norbert L. Kerr & Ernest S. Park, Group Performance in Collaborative and
Social Dilemma Tasks: Progress and Prospects, in GROUP PROCESSES, supra note 86, at
107, 110 (describing group successes in processing large amounts of information).
224 See Hastie, supra note 86, at 148.
225 Id.
226 See Garold Stasser & Dennis Stewart, Discovery of Hidden Profiles by Decision-
Making Groups: Solving a Problem Versus Making a Judgment, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 426, 432-33 (1992).
227 Id. at 428.
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consideration of unshared, critical information during group discus-
sion" appears to be affected by "how members construe their deci-
sion-making task";228 those who believe that they are solving a
problem with a correct solution are more likely to explore shared
information than those who think that they are reaching a consensus.
It follows that "discussions may be more data driven and less con-
sensus driven when members believe that a demonstrably correct
answer exists. '229 Even here, however, the member who knows the
right solution usually requires some initial support in the group; other-
wise the group will frequently fail.230
Another study finds that groups performed exceedingly well, far
better than individual members, in two complex tasks that had
demonstrably correct solutions.23' The first involved a statistical
problem, requiring subjects to guess the composition of an urn con-
taining blue balls and red balls. The second involved a problem in
monetary policy, asking participants to manipulate the interest rate to
steer the economy in good directions. People were asked to perform
as individuals and in groups. The basic results for the two experi-
ments were similar. Groups significantly outperformed individuals.
On a scale of 1 to 100, the average group score in the urn test was 86.8,
as opposed to 83.7 for individuals-a highly significant difference sta-
tistically. For the monetary policy problem, the difference was essen-
tially identical. Interestingly, groups did not, on balance, take longer
to make a decision. In terms of both accuracy and time, there were no
differences between group decisions made with a unanimity require-
ment and group decisions made by majority rule.
How can these results be explained? An obvious possibility is
that group processes play a small role and that the group's discussion
is simply the average of individual judgments. On this view, the judg-
ments of these deliberating groups simply were statistical judgments.
But the evidence is inconsistent with this hypothesis; groups in these
cases did far better than their average member.232 Even more
remarkably, the performance of the median player did not explain the
performance of the group. An alternative hypothesis is that each
group contained one or more strong analysts, who were able to move
228 Id. at 432.
229 Id. at 433.
230 See MacCoun, supra note 10, at 120 (showing that groups will not arrive at accurate
answer unless that answer begins with significant support).
231 ALAN S. BLINDER & JOHN MORGAN, ARE Two HEADS BETTER THAN ONE? AN
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP VS. INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKING 1, 6, 15, 46-47
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7909, 2000).
232 Id. at 41.
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the group in the right direction. But in the experiments, there is little
support for this hypothesis either. "In the end, we are left to conclude
that neither the average player, nor the median player, nor the best
player determine the decisions of the group. ' 233 It seems that, in
these experiments, the better decisions by groups resulted from the
fact that the best points and arguments turned out to spread among
the various individual players. Here we find some basis for the claim
that, under appropriate conditions, groups can do much better than
individuals. The relevant conditions appear to include highly compe-
tent group members attempting to solve statistical problems that all
members knew to have demonstrably correct answers.
2. The Deliberative Opinion Poll
In an important combination of theoretical and empirical work,
James Fishkin has pioneered the idea of a "deliberative opinion poll."
In deliberative opinion polls, small groups, consisting of highly diverse
individuals, are asked to come together and to deliberate about
various issues.2 34 Fishkin has conducted deliberative opinion polls in
several nations, including the United States, England, and Australia.
Fishkin finds some noteworthy shifts in individual views, and he evi-
dently believes that the deliberative process produces learning and
hence improvements in people's judgments.2 35 Because of the nature
of the deliberative opinion poll, it is not possible to test for the ampli-
fication of errors, hidden profiles, or cascade effects. Nor is it pos-
sible, at least in much of the existing work, to see whether deliberating
groups have moved toward correct answers-a point to which I shall
return. But Fishkin does not find a systematic tendency toward group
polarization. In his studies, individuals shift both toward and away
from the median of predeliberation views. 236 It is therefore tempting
to conclude that properly structured deliberation can avoid some or
possibly even all of the problems traced here.
In England, for example, deliberation led to reduced interest in
using imprisonment as a tool for combating crime.237 The percentage
believing that "send[ing] more offenders to prison" is an effective way
to prevent crime went down from 57% to 38%; the percentage
believing that fewer people should be sent to prison increased from
29% to 44%; belief in the effectiveness of "stiffer sentences" was
233 Id. at 46.
234 See FiSHKIN, supra note 5, at 161-86 (discussing deliberative polling).
235 See id. at 168 (stating that voters who participated in poll "changed in dramatic and
coherent ways").
236 Id. at 167-68, 177-81.
237 Id. at 167-68.
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reduced from 78% to 65%.238 Similar shifts were shown in the direc-
tion of greater enthusiasm for procedural rights of defendants and
increased willingness to explore alternatives to prison.239 In other
experiments with the deliberative opinion poll, shifts included a mix-
ture of findings, with larger percentages of individuals concluding that
legal pressures should be increased on fathers for child support (from
70% to 85%) and that welfare and health care should be turned over
to the states (from 56% to 66%).240
On many particular issues, including the two just mentioned, the
effect of deliberation was to create an increase in the popularity of the
view that initially had majority support within the group.241 These
findings are consistent with the prediction of group polarization. But
this was hardly a uniform pattern. On some questions, deliberation
increased the percentage of people holding a minority position (with,
for example, a jump from 36% to 57% of people favoring policies
making divorce "harder to get"). 242 These are not the changes that
would be predicted by group polarization.
We should be careful, however, about celebrating the results
found in Fishkin's studies, at least as I have described them thus far.
What would be most revealing would be a series of findings in which
deliberative opinion polls, using the same methods, led people to cor-
rect answers on questions with objectively correct answers. If there
were evidence that this happened, and happened systematically, then
we would have reason to be confident that deliberation is actually
doing a lot of good. Suppose, for example, that we can agree that
doubling the minimum wage would have significant disemployment
effects, or that a significant increase in capital punishment would have
at least some deterrent effect on crime, or that global warming is
likely to occur, or that DDT has significant effects in reducing the
incidence of malaria in poor countries. Suppose too that diverse
groups, consisting of people with widely varying views on these issues,
were to assemble for a deliberative opinion poll. If members moved
systematically toward the correct answers, then deliberation would, by
hypothesis, be working. But I do not believe that Fishkin's findings
238 Id. at 178-79.
239 Id. at 179-80.
240 Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 220, at 23.
241 See id. at 22 (showing jump, on scale of 1 to 4, from 3.51 to 3.58 in intensity of
commitment to reducing deficit; showing jump, on scale of 1 to 3, from 2.71 to 2.85 in
intensity of support for greater spending on education; showing jump, on scale of 1 to 3,
from 1.95 to 2.16, in commitment to aiding American business interests abroad).
242 Id. at 22-23 (showing an increase, on scale of 1 to 3, from 1.40 to 1.59 in commitment
to spending on foreign aid; also showing decrease, on scale of 1 to 3, from 2.38 to 2.27 in
commitment to spending on social security).
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provide a rigorous test of whether group members are moving in the
right directions. Instead, they show only that people both learn and
move-an impressive finding, to be sure, but one that does not show
that they move systematically toward correct answers.
Why doesn't the deliberative opinion poll always produce group
polarization? There are several possible answers. First, and probably
most important, Fishkin's studies presented participants with a set of
written materials that attempted to be balanced and that contained
detailed arguments supporting both sides. The likely consequence
would be to move people in different directions from those that would
be expected by simple group discussion, unaffected by external mater-
ials inevitably containing a degree of authority. Indeed, the very
effort to produce balance introduces new elements into group deliber-
ations, simply because the argument pool is different from what it
would be if all claims were generated independently by group mem-
bers. Second, Fishkin's deliberators did not vote as a group. While
group polarization is observed when no group decision is expected,
the extent of polarization is likely to decrease, simply because mem-
bers have not been asked to sign onto a group decision as such. Third,
Fishkin's groups were overseen by a moderator, concerned to ensure a
level of openness and likely to alter some of the dynamics discussed
here. A moderator, even a neutral one, can do a great deal to reduce
polarization, by altering both informational and reputational
influences.
Some people are optimistic about the results of deliberative
opinion polls and want them to be used more broadly.2 43 I agree that
they show a great deal of promise, certainly as compared to polls that
consist of mere snapshots of unreflective opinions. But without sys-
tematic evidence that people have been moving in better directions,
we should be cautious about the current findings. From existing delib-
erative opinion polls, taken together with other evidence about group
processes,244 it is not at all clear whether deliberation will increase
accuracy, even under Fishkin's conditions.
The deliberative opinion poll does, however, provide important
lessons about appropriate institutional design for deliberating bodies.
Group polarization can be heightened, diminished, and possibly even
eliminated with seemingly small alterations in institutional arrange-
ments. To the extent that informational pressure and social influences
are likely to have unfortunate effects, valuable correctives can be
243 See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 3 (proposing national day for political
deliberation).
244 See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text (discussing amplification of errors).
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introduced, perhaps above all by exposing group members, at one
point or another, to arguments to which they are not antecedently
inclined. Let us now approach this question more systematically.
III
REMEDIES AND REFORMS
How might group deliberation be improved? How can groups
counteract the problems I have emphasized? An understanding of
problems with deliberating groups helps to specify promising reme-
dies, increasing the likelihood that deliberation will lead to more accu-
rate or sensible solutions. These remedies hold out considerable
promise for ensuring that deliberation does what it is intended to do.
If, for example, mistakes come from informational and reputa-
tional pressure, then the solution is to take steps to increase the likeli-
hood that people will disclose what they know. If people are asked to
think critically rather than to join the group, and they are told that the
group seeks and needs individual contributions, then disclosure is
more likely. Consider a redefinition of what it means to be a "team
player." Frequently a team player is thought to be someone who does
not upset the consensus; but it would be possible to understand team
players as those who increase the likelihood that the team will be
right-if necessary, by disrupting the conventional wisdom.
Institutional reforms can do a great deal to counteract the
problems caused by informational and reputational pressure. The
most difficult problem is the propagation of error. If group members
use the availability heuristic, or if they fall prey to optimistic bias,
blunders will result unless they are corrected by one or more group
members. Even here, however, the best solution is to attempt to
ensure that group members say what they believe to be true.
For those who seek to diminish the effects of informational pres-
sure and social influences, a cautionary note remains. We can imagine
groups that actually benefit from these effects, and hence from cas-
cades and polarization.245 Sometimes it is good for people to silence
themselves; sometimes their contributions would be unhelpful,
because what they believe that they know is false.246 Suppose that
some group members have a terrible idea about how to stabilize the
economy, litigate a case, or reduce the threat of terrorism. If so, we
should be grateful for informational pressure and social influences
245 Hidden profiles, of course, are never desirable, assuming the truth of the information
that is hidden.
246 Of course falsity can sometimes contribute to truth; but it frequently does not.
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that make them defer to those who know much better. As a result of
those pressures, the group's decisions will be improved.
We have seen that polarization might lead people in the right
direction; the question is whether a more extreme version of mem-
bers' antecedent tendency is correct, and that question must be
answered on its merits. The process of polarization does not provide
that answer. Or consider a cascade in which the early movers actually
know the truth, and those who follow them are ignoring private infor-
mation that they believe to be true but that would, on reflection, turn
out to be erroneous or misleading. If so, the followers are not only
rational in disregarding what they know; they also lead the group in a
better direction because they do not give it bad signals. Those who
participate in cascades are acting rationally; but the more important
point is that if those who start cascades are correct, both individuals
and groups are better off as a result. The only problem-and it is a
serious one-is that many cascade participants will fail to disclose
accurate information, and for that reason the group will suffer. The
discussion in this section offers some lessons for how to reduce the
risk of erroneous cascades, by diminishing the effects of informational
and reputational pressures.
Let us focus, then, on the standard cases in which deliberating
groups will do worse if they do not learn what group members know.
For private and public institutions, the overriding question is how to
alter people's incentives in such a way as to increase the likelihood of
disclosure. Many possibilities might be imagined here. Consider two
experiments that have more general implications.
A. Restructured Incentives
Is it possible to reduce the pressures that lead group members to
silence themselves? Is it possible to ensure that people will internalize
some of the benefits that accrue to the group from disclosure?
1. Overcoming Reputational Influences: Priming Critical Thinking
Self-silencing is partly a product of social norms-of a sense that
people will be punished rather than rewarded for disclosing informa-
tion that departs from the group's inclination. Group processes can
aggravate or eliminate this effect. If consensus is prized, and known
to be prized, then self-silencing will be more likely. If the group is
known to welcome new and competing information, then the reward
structure will be fundamentally different.
Evidence for this claim comes from hidden profile experiments
that "primed" people by asking them to engage in a prior task that
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involved either "getting along" or "critical thinking. 2 47 Primed by a
task that called for critical thinking, people were far more likely to
disclose what they knew, and there was a quite substantial reduction
of hidden profiles. 248 (Team players think critically, and they do
not always get along.) For both private and public groups, the
general lesson is clear. If norms favor disclosure of privately held
information, then self-silencing will be reduced significantly; delib-
eration is likely to benefit as a result. Social norms and institutional
culture can go a long way toward reducing the effects of social
pressures.
2. Overcoming Informational Influences: Rewarding Group Success
We have seen that people often do not disclose what they know
because they receive only a fraction of the benefits of disclosure; this
problem is compounded if private information seems likely to be erro-
neous in light of what others have said. But how would groups per-
form if individuals knew that they would be rewarded, not if their own
answer was correct, but if the majority of the group was correct? It
might be speculated that in a situation of this kind, hidden profiles,
cascades, and group polarization would be reduced dramatically. The
reason is that when people are rewarded when their group is right,
they are far more likely to reveal, to that group, what they actually
know. In such a situation, incentives are restructured so that people
internalize the benefits of disclosure.
For supportive evidence, consider an intriguing variation on the
urn experiment, where subjects were paid $2 for a correct group deci-
sion and penalized $2 for an incorrect group decision, with the group
decision determined by majority rule.249 People were neither
rewarded nor punished for a correct individual decision. The result
was that, in 92% of cases, people's announcement matched their pri-
vate draw.250 And because people revealed their private signals, the
system of majority rule produced a huge increase in fully informed
decisions-that is, the outcomes that someone would reach if he was
somehow able to see all private information held by group members.
As an example, consider this round from the majority rule experi-
ment251 (the actual urn was A):
247 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 309.
248 Id. at 309-12.
249 Hung & Plott, supra note 192, at 1511.
250 Id. at 1517-18.
251 Id. at 1515.
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TABLE 3: No CASCADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Private Draw A A A A B A A A B
Decision A A A A B A A A B
What is the explanation for this significantly reduced level of cas-
cades in a system of majority rule? The answer lies in the fact that the
individual knows that he has nothing to gain from a correct individual
decision and everything to gain from a correct group decision. As a
result, it is in the individual's interest to say exactly what he sees
because it is the accurate announcement, from each person, that is
most likely to promote an accurate group decision. A simple way to
understand this point is to assume that a group has a large number of
members and that each member makes an announcement that
matches his private draw. As a statistical matter, it is overwhelmingly
likely that the majority's position will be correct.
Though this experiment is highly artificial, an emphasis on the
importance of group success should improve decisions in many real-
world contexts. Suppose, for example, that members of a jury are
strongly committed to ensuring an accurate outcome from the group;
if so, they will be more likely to disclose what they know.
Whistleblowing is often a product, not of the whistleblower's narrow
self-interest (which may well argue in favor of self-silencing), but of a
belief that it is important to take steps to ensure that the organization
or group acts properly. The general lesson is that identification with
the group's success is more likely to ensure that people will say what
they know. And if group members focus on their own prospects and
accuracy, rather than that of the group, the group is more likely to err.
Both social norms and material incentives play crucial roles in estab-
lishing the priorities, on this count, of group members.
B. Devil's Advocates
How can institutional design take advantage of these findings? If
hidden profiles and self-silencing are the source of group failure, then
an obvious response is to ask some group members to act as "devil's
advocates," urging a position that is contrary to the group's inclina-
tion.252 This was a central suggestion of both the Senate Committee
reporting on intelligence failures in connection with Iraq and of the
review board that investigated large blunders at NASA.253
252 See JANIS, supra note 11, at 267.
253 See supra notes 12-20.
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Those assuming the role of devil's advocate will not face the
reputational pressure that comes from rejecting the dominant position
within the group; they have been charged with doing precisely that.
And because they are asked to take a contrary position, they are freed
from the informational influences that can lead to self-silencing.
Hidden profiles are less likely to remain hidden if one or more group
members are told to disclose the information they have, even if that
information runs contrary to the apparent tendency within the group.
In at least one well-known case, this approach appeared to work.
"During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy gave his brother,
the Attorney General, the unambiguous mission of playing devil's
advocate, with seemingly excellent results in breaking up a premature
consensus" 254-a consensus that might well have led to war.
Unfortunately, research on devil's advocacy in small groups does
not provide conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of devil's advo-
cacy in real-world settings.255 To be sure, many experimenters have
found that protection of genuine dissenting views can enhance group
performance. 256 But a formal requirement of devil's advocacy
enhances group performance far less than does the articulation of gen-
uine dissent. When an advocate's challenges to a group consensus are
insincere, members discount his arguments accordingly. At best, he
merely facilitates a "multisided examination of the problem at
hand. '257 Because devil's advocates have no incentive to sway the
group's members to their side, they accomplish their task even if they
allow the consensus view to refute the unpopular dissenting argu-
ments. Unlike a genuine dissenter, the devil's advocate has little to
gain by zealously challenging the dominant view-and as a result
tends not to persist in challenging the consensus. 258
In any case, the perceived sincerity of a dissenter is an important
factor in determining minority influence. 259 An insincere devil's advo-
cate is unlikely to provide much help. The lesson is that if devil's
advocacy is to work, it is because the group attempts to ensure that
the dissenter actually means what he is saying. If so, better decisions
can be expected.
254 JANIS, supra note 11, at 268.
255 Gary Katzenstein, The Debate on Structured Debate: Toward a Unified Theory, 66
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 316, 317-18 (1996).
256 Alexander L. George & Eric K. Stern, Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making:
From Devil's to Multiple Advocacy, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 484, 486 (2002).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Serge Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PsY-
CHOLOGY 347, 359-65 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985).
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C. Enlisting High-Status Contrarians and Leadership
Some people are more likely to silence themselves than others.
For example, group members are less likely to conform if they have
high social status or are extremely confident about their own views.
260
In a complementary finding, members of low status groups-less edu-
cated people, African Americans, sometimes women-have been
shown to carry less influence within deliberating groups than members
with higher status.2 61 On juries, lower status members, as measured
by their occupations and sex, have been found to be less active and
less influential in deliberation. 262 Creative groups would do well to
take account of these findings.
For example, the problem of unshared information is reduced
when that information is held by a leader within a group; not surpris-
ingly, the leader's words count, because people listen to what leaders
have to say.2 63 In one experiment, a medical team consisting of a resi-
dent physician, an intern, and a third-year medical student showed a
tendency to emphasize unshared items stressed by the resident-and
in this respect did not fall prey to the problem of hidden profiles.
264
More generally, those experienced in the task at hand are more likely
to mention and to repeat unshared information.2 65
One reason for these findings is that those with higher status or
competence are less subject to the reputational pressures that come
from emphasizing unshared information. 266 Another reason is that
leaders and experts are more likely to think that their own informa-
tion is accurate and worth disclosing to the group, notwithstanding the
fact that the information held by other group members cuts in the
other direction.
The simplest lesson is that leaders and high-status members can
do groups a great service by asserting a contrary view, at least for
purposes of argument.2 67 In a similar vein, group leaders should be
reluctant to state a firm view at the outset and should, in that way,
allow space for more information to emerge.
260 See Christensen & Abbott, supra note 112, at 272-76.
261 Id.
262 See Ridgeway, supra note 183, at 54.
263 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 308.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Cf. JANIS, supra note 11, at 262-63 (emphasizing need for leaders to be willing to
accept criticism of their own judgments).
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D. Predeliberation Anonymity, Secret Ballots, and the
Delphi Method
To overcome social influences, people might be asked to register
their opinions anonymously, either in advance of deliberation or after
it has occurred. The secret ballot can be understood as an effort to
insulate people from reputational pressures and to permit them to say
what they believe.268 Many institutions should consider more use of
the secret ballot simply to elicit more information.
As an ambitious effort to implement this idea, consider the
Delphi Technique, a process for aggregating the views of group mem-
bers. The Delphi Technique has four key features. 269 First, it ensures
the anonymity of all members through a self-administered question-
naire. The purpose of anonymity is precisely "to diminish the effects
of social pressures, as from dominant or dogmatic individuals, or from
a majority. '270 Second, the technique is iterated, and there is a system
for controlled feedback on the judgments of others. Members make
individual estimates; all members are informed of the views of other
members; and there are additional rounds of estimates, allowing feed-
back until there is a desired level of convergence. Third, group mem-
bers are permitted to communicate, but sometimes only their ultimate
conclusions (generally in the form of summary statistics involving
quartiles or ranges); and typically the conclusions, given anonymously,
are provided to others by a facilitator or monitor team, often in the
form of a simple summary such as a mean or median value of the
group response. Thus "the feedback comprises the opinions and judg-
ments of all group members and not just the most vocal."' 271 (Note
here that the Delphi Technique is more successful when group mem-
bers are provided not only with the mean or median estimate, but also
with reasons given by group members for their views.272 An account
of reasons is most likely to move people in the direction of the correct
answer.273) Fourth, and finally, the judgments of group members are
subject to a statistical aggregation.
The Delphi Technique provides a sharp contrast with efforts to
obtain the judgments of statistical groups and also with interacting
groups containing open deliberation. In several contexts, the Delphi
268 See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 13-15 (1995) (discussing secret ballot as protection against
social pressures).
269 See Rowe & Wright, supra note 106.
270 Id. at 126.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 129.
273 Id. at 129-30.
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Technique has provided more accuracy than open discussion. 274 For
general almanac questions, the Delphi Technique was found to pro-
duce better answers than individual estimates, though open discussion
did still better, apparently because it served to correct errors.275 A
natural alternative to the Delphi Technique would be a system in
which ultimate judgments were stated anonymously, but only after
deliberation. Anonymity would insulate group members from reputa-
tional pressure, and to that extent could reduce the problem of self-
silencing. But it would do little to reduce informational pressure.
E. Roles, Experts, and Forewarning
Imagine a deliberating group consisting of people with specific
roles appreciated and known by all group members. One person
might be understood to have medical expertise; a second might be a
lawyer; a third might know about public relations; a fourth might be a
statistician. In such a group, it might be hypothesized that sensible
information aggregation would be far more likely, simply because
each member knows that each of the others has something particular
to contribute. Hidden profiles should be less likely to remain hidden
if there is a strict division of labor, in which each person is knowledge-
able, and known to be knowledgeable, about something in
particular. 276
Several experiments support the hypothesis.2 77 In one such
experiment, each member of a three-person group was given a good
deal of information about one of three murder suspects. 278 In half of
these groups, the "expertise" of each member was publicly identified
to all before discussion began; in half of them, there was no such
public identification of experts. The bias in favor of shared informa-
tion was substantially reduced in those groups in which experts were
publicly identified as such.279 The reduction of the bias was signifi-
cantly smaller when there was no public identification of experts and
274 See id. at 130; Hastie, supra note 86, at 139.
275 See Hastie, supra note 86, at 139-45.
276 See Garold Stasser, The Uncertain Role of Unshared Information in Collective
Choice, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATION: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
49, 56-57 (Leigh L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999).
277 See Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 308 (citing studies showing
that "when the bearer of unique information was labeled an expert, the group seemingly
paid more attention to the information"); Garold Stasser et al., Expert Roles and Informa-
tion Exchange During Discussion: The Importance of Knowing Who Knows What, 31 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 244, 248-49, 256 (1995) (showing that assigning expert
roles led to more discussion of unshared data).
278 See Stasser et al., supra note 277, at 248-49.
279 Id. at 249, 259-62.
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when each group member was simply told, by the experimenter, that
he or she was an expert on a particular candidate. 280 The lesson is
clear: If a group seeks to obtain the information that its members
hold, it would make sense to inform all group members, before delib-
eration begins, that different members have different, and relevant,
information to contribute. Unfortunately, however, the effect of role
assignment in reducing hidden profiles is not huge.281
F. General Lessons
These various findings offer general lessons about how deliber-
ating groups might significantly reduce the adverse effects of informa-
tional influences and social pressures. The lessons apply to such
diverse groups as corporate boards, juries, multimember judicial
panels, and administrative agencies.282 If information is dispersed
within the group, leaders would do well not to state a firm view at the
outset; they might well refrain from expressing any opinion at all until
other people have said what they think. Following the model of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, they might indicate sympathy for a wide
range of views, encouraging diverse opinions to arise.283 They might
suggest in particular that they welcome information and perspectives
that diverge from their own. A degree of impartiality, on the part of
leaders, would go a long way toward encouraging diversity of views.
And if reasonable alternatives are not being discussed, group mem-
bers might be assigned the task of developing and presenting them.
Independent subcommittees might be asked to generate new views,
possibly views that compete with one another.
Consider, for example, the CIA and NASA examples with which
I began. Subsequent investigators found that both agencies contained
enough information to prevent their large-scale blunders. If internal
processes had been properly structured, those blunders would have
been less likely to occur. Suppose that a norm of critical thinking had
been encouraged, so that employees would have felt free to challenge
assumptions about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or about the
assumed safety of the Challenger and Columbia flights. Or suppose
that both agencies had created an internal system of checks and bal-
ances, ensuring careful attention to competing views. If so, it would
have been far more likely that relevant information would have
emerged, and been taken seriously, during internal processes.
280 Id. at 262.
281 Stasser & Titus, Hidden Profiles, supra note 10, at 310 (summarizing studies).
282 For overlapping prescriptions, see JANIS, supra note 11, at 262-73.
283 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 115-17 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003).
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Of course time is limited, and prescriptions that are suitable for
some organizations will not be suitable for others. In the context of
jury deliberations, subcommittees would make little sense; what is
required is an initial degree of openness in which jurors explore rele-
vant facts before announcing a conclusion. For regulatory agencies,
by contrast, competing subdivisions can help to ensure a range of per-
spectives. In this vein, Christopher Edley has suggested that Congress
should create, within the Department of Homeland Security, an
independent Office on Rights and Liberties, whose specific mission
would be to ensure that the effort to protect the nation from terrorist
threats does not unduly compromise individual rights.284 In Edley's
account, the Office would receive and address public complaints
about rights violations; it would also make classified quarterly reports
to Congress and the President, along with unclassified reports to the
public. 285 The proposal deserves serious consideration as a check on
amplification of errors, hidden profiles, and group polarization.28
6
An optimistic view of the structure of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency would suggest that the proliferation of offices with over-
lapping tasks-including a pro-regulatory Air Office and a more
technocratic Planning Office-ensures a kind of internal system of
checks and balances. 287 Under existing law, the independent regula-
tory agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Federal Communications Commission, may not have more than a
bare majority of their members from a single political party.288 This
limitation might be understood as an effort to protect against the
deliberative pathologies that are likely to result if deliberations are
restricted to like-minded people.
Many variations on these themes might be imagined. My goal
here has not been to set out an institutional blueprint, but to suggest
some general points that deliberating groups might take into account
when structuring their processes for eliciting and aggregating informa-
tion and points of view.
284 See Christopher Edley, A U.S. Watchdog for Civil Liberties, WASH. POST., July 14,
2002, at B7.
285 See id.
286 The 9/11 Commission, citing the lack of a "voice within the executive branch"
designed to consider liberty concerns, has made a similar recommendation. See NAT'L
COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 395
(2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html.
287 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALJDIRTY AIR 79-86
(1981) (describing roles of respective offices).
288 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994); 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (2000).
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IV
INFORMATION MARKETS
Deliberation is one way to aggregate privately held information;
but there are many other possibilities. Open-source software, for
example, provides a method by which decentralized "bits" of privately
held information can be drawn together in software design, thus
ensuring improvements that go far beyond the capacities of small
groups of experts.2 89 With open-source software, expert groups do
not deliberate about technological improvements; instead numerous
contributors can bring their creativity and knowledge to bear.
More generally, the Internet itself is easily used as an aggregative
mechanism.2 90 For example, a "wiki" is a website that allows any user
to add material and to edit what previous users have done.291
Wikipedia operates as a free, web-based encyclopedia2 92 that attempts
to take advantage of the information held by thousands of contribu-
tors ("Wikipedians"), who add to and edit the encyclopedia. We
should see wikis through the lens of Hayek's emphasis on the highly
dispersed nature of information in society and the value of developing
mechanisms that serve to aggregate that information. 293
In a similar vein, a great deal of recent attention has been paid to
weblogs, which can serve to elicit and aggregate the information held
by countless contributors. 294 If thousands of people are maintaining
their own "blogs," they should be able to act as fact-checkers, and as
supplemental information sources, for the more prominent members
of the mass media.2 95 And if tens of thousands of people are reading
the most prominent blogs, then errors, on the part of bloggers, should
289 See LAWRENCE LEssmG, FREE CULTURE 44 (2004) (emphasizing virtues of open-
source software).
290 For a superb general discussion of aggregation through peer-to-peer interactions
with particular reference to the Internet, see Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux
and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
291 Wiki, in WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
Wiki (last modified Apr. 3, 2005).
292 See Wikipedia, in WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 291. 1 am
grateful to Agata Waclawik for this reference.
293 See generally Hayek, supra note 128. Note in this regard that Lawrence Lessig plans
to update his book CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000) by posting it as a wiki.
See Lawrence Lessig, Tis the Season: II, LESSiG BLOG (posted Dec. 24, 2004, 1:51 PM), at
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/002358.shtml.
294 For an overview, see Daniel W. Drezner & Henry Farrell, The Power and Politics of
Blogs (July 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law
Review).
295 For a popular overview, see generally HUGH HEwrrr, BLOG: UNDERSTANDING THE
INFORMATION REFORMATION THAT'S CHANGING YOUR WORLD (2005).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
1022 [Vol. 80:962
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1022 2005
GROUP JUDGMENTS
be corrected quickly.296 Of course blogs may (and do) also suffer
from amplification of error, hidden profiles, cascade effects, and
group polarization. But they hold out the promise of aggregating
information held by large numbers of people. Sheer numbers are
playing a large role here, because information aggregation is likely to
work best when many people are involved; but it is also important that
reasons and information are being exchanged, in a way that can lead
to corrections and real creativity.
Another way to aggregate information is to rely on the price
signal, which has a similar aggregative function. Consider a familiar
informal challenge when people disagree on some question of fact:
"Want to bet?"2 97 The point of the challenge is to suggest that the
speaker is quite confident of her judgment, enough so to ask the
person with whom she disagrees to back her conviction with dollars.
Not infrequently, the challenge is successful in the sense that it oper-
ates to establish, to all concerned, that one or another belief is weakly
held. But it is possible to use economic incentives far more formally
and systematically.
In fact the great advantage of the price signal is that it aggregates
both the information and the tastes of numerous people, producing
judgments that incorporate more material than could possibly be
assembled by any central planner, even one who insists on delibera-
tion with and among experts. Recall Hayek's claim about the price
system and its aggregative properties, 298 a claim that I have used as
the basis for a Hayekian challenge to generalized celebrations of
deliberation. We can even see a link between the Hayekian claim and
the Condorcet Jury Theorem; precisely because many people are
making purchasing decisions, their aggregate judgments are highly
296 Ana Marie Cox ("Wonkette"), Presentation at the American Political Science Asso-
ciation (Sept. 3, 2004). For discussion of the role of bloggers in ferreting out errors in the
mass media, see HEwrrr, supra note 295.
297 See the outline of the debate between Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich, infra note 390.
298 See Hayek, supra note 128, at 524-28 (discussing dispersed nature of knowledge and
value of aggregating information through price system). Information markets (sometimes
called prediction markets) have received discussion in the literature. See generally Joyce
Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research, in HAND-
BOOK OF RESULTS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith
eds., forthcoming 2005) (exploring results of Iowa markets), available at http://www.biz.
uiowa.edu/faculty/trietz/papers/iemresults.pdf (working draft, March 2003); Joyce Berg et
al., What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets, in
UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC INTERACTION 444 (Wulf Albers et al. eds., 1997) (discussing
Iowa Electronic Markets); Robert Forsythe et al., Anatomy of an Experimental Political
Stock Market, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 1142 (1992), (discussing origins and performance of
Iowa markets); Robert Forsythe et al., Wishes, Expectations, and Actions: A Survey on
Price Formation in Election Stock Markets, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 83 (1999) [herein-
after Forsythe et al., Wishes] (reviewing field experiments on information markets).
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likely to be right, at least if most purchasers have relevant informa-
tion. And if an emphasis is placed on the information-aggregating
properties of markets, it would seem plain that if we are attempting to
improve on the answer produced by statistical means and deliberating
groups, we might consider an increasingly popular possibility: Create
a market.299 Information markets, a recent innovation, have proved
remarkably successful at forecasting future events; they seem to do far
better, in many domains, than deliberating groups. Such markets are
worth sustained attention, in part because they offer important lessons
about how to make deliberation go better or worse, and in part
because they provide a useful model for many private and public
organizations.
A central advantage of information markets is that they impose
the right incentives for people to disclose the information that they
hold. Recall that in a deliberating group, members often have little
incentive to say what they know. By speaking out, they provide bene-
fits to others, while possibly facing high private costs. Information
markets realign incentives in a way that is precisely designed to over-
come these problems. Because investments in such markets are gen-
erally not disclosed to the public, investors need not fear reputational
sanctions if, for example, they have predicted that a company's sales
will be low or that a certain candidate will be elected president. And
because people stand to gain or lose from their investments, they have
a strong incentive to use (and in that sense to disclose) whatever pri-
vate information they hold; they can capture, rather than give to
others, the benefits of disclosure. The use of private information will
be reflected in the price signal. In these crucial ways, the problems
that infect deliberating groups are largely eliminated in information
markets. I have outlined a series of initiatives that should improve the
performance of deliberating groups. But information markets auto-
matically do much of the work of those initiatives.
We have seen that optimal deliberation is structured in a way that
permits relevant and correct information to emerge-and that reduces
the likelihood that useless, biased, or incorrect information will under-
mine deliberation. For their part, information markets impose strong
incentives for traders to ferret out accurate information. Perhaps
299 See generally Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. ECON. PERSP.
107 (2004) (valuable overview of prediction markets); Michael Abramowicz, Information
Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 933 (2004) (recommending use of information markets by administrative agen-
cies); Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from
the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CoRP. L. 589 (2003)
(emphasizing accuracy of information markets, even when there are relatively few traders).
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most importantly, information markets have been found not to
amplify individual errors but to eliminate them; the prices that result
from trading prove reliable even if many individual traders err.3°°
Traders do not trade blindly; they are entirely able to stop trading, for
a moment or much more, in order to retrieve better information that
will give them an advantage. But in some deliberating groups, partici-
pants cannot leave; they must continue deliberating, and the necessary
information is, at best, dispersed and locked within individual partici-
pants. Well-functioning systems of deliberation encourage group
members to act dynamically to acquire further information, just as
markets tend to do.
Of course investors, like everyone else, are subject to the infor-
mational pressure imposed by the views of others. But a market cre-
ates strong incentives for revelation of whatever information people
actually hold. For small groups, of course, information markets are
likely to be too "thin" to be useful; a certain number of investors is
required to get a market off the ground. 30 1 Hence feasibility is a
serious constraint on the use of information markets. In some con-
texts, however, private and public organizations might use markets as
a complement to or even a substitute for deliberation.
How might information markets be used? Consider a few
possibilities:
1. Uncertain about sales projections for the future, a company
might not ask its employees to make predictions or to delib-
erate with one another. Instead it might create an informa-
tion market, in which employees are allowed to place
anonymous bets about likely outcomes. 30 2
2. As an aid to its assessment of future events in the world, the
White House and the Department of Defense might maintain
an information market in which investors predict outcomes of
national importance-for example, the likelihood that the
government of Iran will be toppled in the next calendar year,
that there will be a terrorist attack in Europe within the same
period, or that free elections will be held in Iraq by a speci-
fied time.
300 See infra notes 333-40.
301 But see Levmore, supra note 299, at 601 (showing considerable success even within
quite thin markets).
302 See KAY-YUT CHEN & CHARLES R. PLOTr, INFORMATION AGGREGATION MECHA-
NISMS: CONCEPT, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR A SALES FORECASTING PROBLEM 3
(Div. of the Humanities & Soc. Sci., Cal. Inst. of Tech., Social Science Working Paper No.
113, March 2002) (describing variation of this model employed by Hewlett-Packard), avail-
able at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1131.pdf.
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3. The cost of an environmental regulation might be disputed
and experts within government might be unsure about how to
resolve the dispute. It would be possible to create an infor-
mation market asking whether, by a specified date, the pro-
jected costs are above $400 million, above $500 million, or
above $600 million.30 3
4. Much of the time, the benefits of environmental regulation
are at least as controversial as the costs. Experts might disa-
gree about whether a carcinogen causes harms at low levels,
or even whether a substance is carcinogenic at all. An infor-
mation market might be created to make predictions about
the benefits of one or another course of action. 3°4
5. Company executives might want to know which of their
movies are most likely to be serious Oscar contenders. An
Oscar nomination gives a large boost to ticket sales, and
hence it is extremely valuable to be able to plan in advance.
Existing markets might be enlisted to answer the relevant
questions. 30 5
6. Regulators are interested in trends involving air pollution,
including increases or decreases in emissions over time and
also in concentrations of pollutants in the ambient air. An
information market might make projections about sulfur
dioxide and particulate concentrations in New York City,
Chicago, and Los Angeles in the next decade.
7. Officials in a political campaign, or in another nation, often
want to know a particular candidate's likelihood of success at
a particular moment in time. Instead of relying exclusively
on polling data, they might consult information markets,
assessing the likelihood of success for the candidate in
question.
8. It is important both for government and for outside observers
to know the size of federal budget deficits. Government pro-
jections are greatly disputed and some of them might well be
303 On the uses of information markets in cost-benefit analysis, see Abramowicz, supra
note 299, at 997-1019.
304 Id. at 992-93. Of course it would be necessary to specify a source that would pro-
duce, at the relevant time, an authoritative judgment about benefits, that is, a judgment
that could be deemed authoritative by all sides.
305 See Levmore, supra note 299, at 593 (describing how film studios have already begun
utilizing information markets to structure film distribution).
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self-serving. Information markets might provide more reli-
able estimates.30 6
9. Regulators might be concerned about the likely risks of a new
disease or of an old disease that seems to be growing in mag-
nitude. To assess the risks, they might create an information
market, designed to predict the numbers of deaths that will
be attributed to, for example, mad cow disease over a speci-
fied period.
10. Federal and state agencies monitor a range of institutions to
ensure that they are solvent. 30 7 One problem is that such
agencies do not know whether insolvencies are likely to be
many or few in a particular year; another is that the solvency
of particular institutions can be difficult to predict in advance.
Information markets could help with both problems.30 8
11. The national government might want to know the number of
people who are likely to be infected by HIV in the United
States or Africa by the year 2010; the answer to that question
might be relevant to its policy judgments. An information
market might be used to make predictions about the future
progress of the disease.30 9 Such markets might generally be
used to make predictions about the likely effects of develop-
ment projects, such as those involving vaccinations and mor-
tality reductions. 310
12. The government might seek to predict the likelihood and
magnitude of damage from natural disasters, including torna-
does and earthquakes. Accurate information could greatly
assist in advance planning. Information markets could easily
be created to help in that task.
Some of these examples involve private behavior. Others involve
the judgments of public institutions. Some might seem fanciful.
Others involve predictions on which information markets are already
flourishing. Let us turn, then, to actual practice.
306 See Abramowicz, supra note 299, at 990-92.
307 See id. at 987-90.
308 Most dramatically, they "might have led to earlier recognition of the savings and
loans crisis in the 1980s." Id. at 988.
309 See ROBERT W. HAHN & PAUL C. TETLOCK, HARNESSING THE POWER OF INFORMA-
TION: A NEW APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3-6 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr.
For Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 04-21, 2004), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=846.
310 Id.
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A. Practice and Evidence
1. An Abandoned Initiative
In many imaginable markets, people might make claims about
facts, or predictions about the future, and they might stand to gain or
lose from their predictions. In the summer of 2003, analysts at the
Department of Defense built directly on this idea.31' To predict
important events in the world, including terrorist attacks, they sought
to create a kind of market in which ordinary people actually could
place bets. The proposed Policy Analysis Market potentially would
have allowed people to invest in their predictions about such matters
as the growth of the Egyptian economy, the death of Yassir Arafat,
the military withdrawal of the United States from specified nations,
and the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the United States. Investors
would have won or lost money on the basis of the accuracy of their
predictions.
Predictably, the Policy Analysis Market produced a storm of criti-
cism. Ridiculed as "offensive" and "useless," the proposal was aban-
doned. Senator Tom Daschle called the market "the most
irresponsible, outrageous and poorly thought-out of anything that I
have heard the administration propose to date. '312 Senator Byron
Dorgan argued that it is "morally bankrupt for a government agency
to make a profitable game out of the deaths of American troops,
heads of state, and nuclear missile attacks. ' 313 A private Policy Anal-
ysis Market, specializing in the Middle East, was promised in 2003, but
it did not go forward.31 4
Amid the war on terrorism, why was the Department of Defense
so interested in the Policy Analysis Market? The answer is simple: It
wanted to have some assistance in predicting geopolitical events,
including those that would endanger American interests, and it
believed that a market would provide that help. It speculated that if a
large number of people could be given an incentive to aggregate their
private information, in the way that the Policy Analysis Market would
do, government officials would learn a great deal. Apparently it
believed that such a market would provide an important supplement
311 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 107-08 (discussing this initiative).
312 Ronald Bailey, Betting on Terror: Why Futures Markets in Terror and Assassinations
Are a Good Idea, REASONONLINE, July 30, 2003, at http://www.reason.com/rb/rb073003.
shtml.
313 Byron L. Dorgan, Letter to the Editor, The Pentagon's HIl-Conceived Market, WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at A20.
314 For a replicate of the site, see Policy Analysis Market, at http://www.ratical.org/rat
ville/CAH/linkscopy/PAM (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
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to deliberative processes both within government and without.315 No
one knows how the Department of Defense would have reacted to the
projections of information markets; the most reasonable speculation is
that those projections would have been used, not as the final word,
but as providing valuable information about future events.
2. Iowa Electronic Markets
If this idea seems fanciful, consider the fact that since 1988, the
University of Iowa has run the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), which
allow people to bet on the outcome of presidential elections. Origi-
nally the IEM permitted people to trade only in the expected fraction
of the popular vote to be obtained by presidential candidates. 316
Securities were offered that would pay $2.50 multiplied by the speci-
fied candidate's share of the vote. If, for example, George H.W. Bush
received 50% of the vote, then the shareholder would receive $1.25.
Shares could be bought and sold until the day before the election.
Since their opening, the IEM have expanded from these modest roots.
In the recent past, traders have been able to bet on the market capital-
ization that Google will achieve in its initial public offering, the price
of Microsoft stock at a future date, and Federal Reserve monetary
policy, in addition to betting on American elections. 31 7
For presidential elections-still the most popular markets that
IEM operates-traders have recently been permitted to choose from
two types of markets.318 In a "winner-take-all" market, traders win $1
for each "future" in the winning candidate that they own and nothing
for shares of the losing candidate. In a "vote-share" market, traders
in "candidate futures" win $1 multiplied by the proportion of the pop-
ular vote that the candidate received. 31 9 Thus, in a winner-take-all
market, a "Dukakis future" was worth nothing after the election,
while in a vote-share market, each Dukakis future paid $0.456. In a
winner-take-all market, the market price reflects traders' perceptions
315 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 107 (discussing Defense Department
proposal).
316 See Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets
7-10 & nn.6-7 (July 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.
edu/iem/archive/forecasting.pdf.
317 See Iowa Electronic Markets (operated by Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of
Iowa), at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/markets (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
318 See Market Information: Pres04.,WTA, Iowa Electronic Markets (operated by
Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa), at http://128.255.244.6OWebEx/marketinfo-
english.cfm?MarketID=78 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
319 See Market Information: Pres04_VS, Iowa Electronic Markets (operated by Henry
B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa), at http://128.255.244.60/WebEx/marketinfo-english.
cfm?MarketID=66 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005); see also Forsythe et al., Wishes, supra note
298, at 85 (discussing vote-share market and others).
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of the likelihood that each candidate will win the election. Perhaps
more interestingly, observers can use the prices in a vote-share market
much as they might use a poll. These prices are the market's estimate
of each candidate's likely share of the vote when the election occurs.
In each case, the market price reflects the aggregate information held
by participants.
The IEM operate much like an ordinary stock market. To enter,
each participant must purchase "unit portfolios" consisting of one
future in each candidate for each dollar that the trader puts into the
market. 320 Once she has bought enough of these "unit portfolios," she
can unbundle the contracts and trade individual shares. All trading is
fully computerized and traders must reach the markets through the
Internet. 321 Unlike most stock exchanges, the IEM do not allow spec-
ulators to sell futures short. Nevertheless, as in a typical stock market,
traders can issue bids and asks (limit orders) or accept outstanding
offers (market orders). While most traders merely accept market
orders rather than choosing their own prices, a small group of "mar-
ginal traders" trade frequently and post limit orders. 322 As we shall
see, it is these traders who have the greatest effect on prices.
As a predictor, the Iowa Electronic Markets have produced
extraordinarily accurate judgments. Before the 2004 elections, they
did far better than professional polling organizations, 323 out-
performing polls 451 out of 596 times.324 In the week before the four
elections from 1988 to 2000, the predictions in the Iowa market
showed an average absolute error of just 1.5 percentage points, a sig-
nificant improvement over the 2.1 percentage point error in the final
Gallup polls. 32 5 In 2004, the Iowa market did even better, showing, on
midnight of November 1, Bush with 50.45% of the vote, and Kerry
with 49.55%-eerily close to the final numbers of 51.56% for Bush
and 48.44% for Kerry.326 This prediction was far better than the pre-
dictions that emerged from the more conventional indicators of likely
results, including consumer confidence and job growth.327
320 Forsythe et al., Wishes, supra note 298, at 86.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 99-100.
323 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 112.
324 See HAHN & TELOCK, supra note 309, at 4.
325 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 112.
326 See Erin Jordan, Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result, DES MOINES
REG., Nov. 10, 2004, at 5B. Note that there was a great deal of volatility on election day,
evidently produced by exit polls showing a likely victory by Kerry; I return to the issue of
volatility below. See id.
327 Sue Kirchhoff, Economic Predictors Don't Track Vote Results, USA TODAY, Nov. 15,
2004, at 4B. Note, however, that "Polly," an aggregate predictor that includes the Iowa
Electronic Markets, performed even better. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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The IEM have proved accurate not only on election eve but also
in long forecasting horizons.328 Such markets are hardly limited to the
United States. In other nations, universities are operating similar
markets; examples include the University of British Columbia Elec-
tion Stock Market, involving Canada, 329 and Vienna University of
Technology, operating the Austrian Electronic Market. 330 Although
the relevant districts are quite small, Australian bookmakers have
shown a high degree of accuracy in predicting district-level races.331
In fact, InTrade, a political market based in Dublin, accurately pre-
dicted not only the 2004 victory for President Bush but also the partic-
ular outcomes in the battleground states.332
3. Other Information Markets: Hollywood, Weather, and Beyond
Outside of the political context, consider the Hollywood Stock
Exchange, in which people predict Oscar nominees and winners (as
well as opening weekend box office successes). For the Hollywood
Stock Exchange, the level of accuracy has been impressive, especially
in view of the fact that the traders use virtual rather than real money.
"HSX offers good predictions of a film's gross receipts before release
and, relatively speaking, even better predictions after opening
weekend-when a large number of traders have some information in
the form of (or at least the possibility of) observing the finished film
on screen, along with audience reactions. '333 As a result, "studios
have begun relying on these estimates to structure the distribution of
their films. ' 334 The market has proven successful in predicting award
winners and box office returns.335 Perhaps the most impressive
achievement to date is its uncanny accuracy in predicting Oscar win-
328 See Berg et al., supra note 316, at 11-13.
329 Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Election Stock Market,
at http://esm.ubc.ca/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
330 Technische Universitat Wein, Austrian Political Stock Markets/Austrian Electronics
Markets Homepage, at http://www.imw.tuwien.ac.at/apsm/ (last updated Mar. 12, 2003).
331 Justin Wolfers & Andrew Leigh, Three Tools for Forecasting Federal Elections: Les-
sons from 2001, 37 AUSTL. J. POL. Sci. 223, 234-40 (2002).
332 See John Tierney, Now That the Dust Has Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, § 1
(National) at 34.
333 Levmore, supra note 299, at 593.
334 Id.
335 Erica A. Klarreich, Best Guess: Economists Explore Betting Markets as Prediction
Tools, 164 Sci. NEWS 251, 251 (2003), available at http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/2003
1018/bob9.asp; David M. Pennock et al., The Real Power of Artificial Markets, 291 SCIENCE
987, 987 (2001) (letter to the editor) (showing accuracy of Hollywood Stock Exhange).
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ners in 2005, with correct judgments in all eight of the categories for
which trading was allowed. 336
The success of information markets is seen in many other areas as
well. For example, the futures market for oranges does a better job
predicting weather in Florida than the National Weather Service. 337
A large prediction market, producing a typical event turnover in the
hundreds of millions of dollars, focuses on the likelihood that eco-
nomic data released later in the week will show specific values;338 the
market performs at least as well as the consensus forecasts of a survey
of about fifty professional forecasters.339 Companies have started to
use internal prediction markets to answer relevant questions,
including likely sales in specific periods.340 The level of accuracy here
is also high-far better, in all probability, than what would emerge
from statistical means or deliberation, where excessive optimism can
cause serious problems.
For example, Hewlett Packard (HP) and the California Institute
of Technology initiated a project to study experimental markets as an
information aggregation mechanism involving product sales. 341 The
experimenters selected individuals who worked in different parts of
HP's business operation. Because of its small size, the market was a
very "thin" one, meaning that there were few participants and that the
market was far less liquid than the much "thicker" Iowa Electronic
Markets. 342 Participants were chosen with the thought that each could
contribute information from his department in buying and selling the
relevant futures, which were tied to sales and bonuses for executives
336 See Press Release, Hollywood Stock Exchange, Traders Hit a Perfect 100% of Oscar
Winners (Feb. 28, 2005), at http://www.hsx.com/about/press/050229.htm. An intriguing
puzzle: Less specialized markets, trading for real money and with substantial numbers of
traders, proved less accurate than the Hollywood Stock Exchange. For an overview, see
Stephen Phelan, How to Win On Oscar, SUNDAY HERALD, Feb. 27, 2005, at 12, which
notes that according to the leading information markets, The Aviator would win for best
picture, Clive Owen would win for best supporting actor, and Martin Scorsese would win
for best director-all incorrect predictions. The puzzle lies in the fact that a smaller
market, not involving real money, produced more accuracy than a larger one with signifi-
cant stakes. One might expect that the real traders-on, for example, tradesports.com-
would, at worst, see the trends on hsx.com, and invest accordingly. The solution to the
puzzle probably lies in two facts: expertise and information costs. The traders on hsx.com
are specialists, and the traders on the other markets, almost all of whom are not American,
are generalists. If those generalists knew of the success of hsx.com, they would undoubt-
edly bet accordingly. I predict that in the future they will (but I'm not betting on it).
337 Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 861, 871 (1984).
338 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 113-14.
339 Id.
340 See Charles R. Plott, Markets as Information Gathering Tools, 67 S. ECON. J. 1, 12-13
(2000).
341 See CHEN & PLOT-, supra note 302, at 3.
342 Id. at 5-10.
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(which, in turn, are closely tied to profits). 343 The markets were
organized so that securities existed for intervals of sales. For example,
one security would pay off if sales were between one and ten printers;
another would pay off if sales were between ten and twenty. 344 In
most of the experiments, the possible range of sales was divided into
ten intervals of equal size. On the basis of the prices of each security,
the experimenters could guess how many units HP would sell that
month. Information markets were expected to have large potential
advantages over internal projections. Those involved in sales have an
incentive to understate projected outcomes, so as to ensure that they
do not fall short of expectations; this bias, or a competing bias in favor
of excessive optimism, might well be reduced through market
incentives. 345
The results showed that the markets' predictions were a consider-
able improvement over HP's official forecasts. In no fewer than six of
the eight markets for which official forecasts were available, the
market prediction was significantly closer to the actual outcome than
the official forecast 346-and this was in spite of anecdotal evidence
that the markets' activities were included as inputs in generating the
official forecast.347
In fact, information markets are springing up all over the
Internet, allowing people to make bets on the likely outcomes of
sports, entertainment, finance, and political events.348 We can find
actual or proposed prediction markets about any number of questions:
Will gas prices reach $3 per gallon? Will cellular life be found on
Mars? Will Osama Bin Laden be captured by a certain date? Will
small pox return to the United States? Will there be a sequel to
Master and Commander? Will the Federal Communications Commis-
sion be abolished? These and other questions are being asked on
information markets. Consider the following list:
* Hollywood Stock Exchange at http://www.hsx.com (site
allowing users to bet on box office success of actors and
movies).
" University of British Columbia Election Stock Market at http://
esm.ubc.ca (market in which investors bet on outcomes of local
and federal elections in Canada).
343 Id.
344 Id. at 7.
345 Id. at 3-4.
346 Id. at 12-13.
347 Id. at 5.
348 In many jurisdictions in the United States, however, these markets are forbidden as
gambling; I do not explore the legal issues here.
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* Iowa Electronic Markets at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/ieml
(market in which contract payoffs depend on economic and
political events).
* Foresight Exchange at http://www.ideosphere.com/fx/
(entertainment site allowing users to bet on the likely outcome
of future events using "funny money").
" Tradesports at http://www.tradesports.com (online trading
exchange focused on the outcome of sporting events).
" News Futures at http://us.newsfutures.com/home/home.html
(provider of prediction markets that delivers forecasts on issues
for corporations).
" Probability Sports at http://www.probabilitysports.com (online
sports betting site).
" Economic Derivatives at http://www.economicderivatives.com
(online markets for economic derivatives).
" Wahlstreet at http://www.wahlstreet.de (German political
futures market).
4. Aggregating Information Through Markets
All in all, prediction markets have been spectacularly successful
in terms of the aggregate accuracy of the resulting "prices." Why is
this? Note that such markets do not rely on the median or average
judgment of a randomly selected group of people. They are genuine
markets. Those who participate are self-selected. They must believe
that they have relevant information; it is costly for them to "vote,"
and they probably will not do so unless they think that they have
something to gain.349 In addition, votes are not weighted equally. If
people want to invest a few dollars, they are permitted to do so, but
they can invest a great deal more if they are confident of their
answer.350 Intensity of belief is captured in prices.
There is a further point. People are permitted to buy and sell
shares on a continuing basis. "Unlike polls ...each trader in the
349 Note that some markets involve virtual rather than real money. Newsfutures, for
example, uses virtual currency that can be redeemed for monthly prizes (such as appli-
ances); Foresight Exchange and the Hollywood Stock Exchange use "virtual currency," so
that people do not earn real money, but instead attempt to enhance their reputation and
their self-image. Note in this regard that Foresight Exchange lists publicly the "top ten
investors by score." See Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, at http://www.ideosphere.
com/fx/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
350 Some markets, however, impose limits on permissible investments; the IEM is an
example, with a ceiling of $500. Frequently Asked Questions, Iowa Electronic Markets
(operated by Henry B. Tippie Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Iowa), at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/
iem/faq.html#Questions (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Note also that some markets, like the
Hollywood Stock Exchange, do not involve real dollars. It is noteworthy that successful
predictions are found even in such markets. Klarreich, supra note 335, at 251.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 80:962
HeinOnline  -- 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1034 2005
GROUP JUDGMENTS
market sees the net effect of the belief of all other traders, and the
time series of changes in those beliefs .... -351 As a a result, the
market is "more than a static, one-time prediction but rather a
dynamic system that can respond instantaneously to the arrival of new
information. ' 352 Moreover, a correct answer is rewarded and an
incorrect one is punished. Hence investors have a strong incentive to
be right. In these circumstances, accurate answers can emerge even if
only a small percentage of participants have good information. In the
Iowa Electronic Markets, for example, it turns out that 85% of the
traders do not seem to be particularly wise.353 They hold onto their
shares for a long period and then simply accept someone else's prices.
The predictions of the market are driven by the other 15%-frequent
traders who post their offers rather than accepting those made by
other people. To work well, prediction markets do not require accu-
rate judgments by anything like the majority of participants. 354 In this
sense, information markets are very different from the ordinary judg-
ments of deliberating groups. The resulting prices do not amplify or
perpetuate cognitive errors; on the contrary, they correct them,
because shrewd traders are able to invest in a way that corrects for
even widespread errors.355
Of course information markets involve a measure of deliberation.
Many individual investors deliberate with others before they invest.
In some such markets, investors undoubtedly act as "teams," pooling
resources after deliberating together about what to do. The point is
that ultimate decisions come not from asking group members to come
up with a mutually agreeable conclusion, but by reference to the price
signal, which will have aggregated a great deal of diverse information.
It is for this reason that information markets outperform deliberative
processes.
351 Berg et al., supra note 316, at 9.
352 Id.
353 See Klarreich, supra note 335, at 252.
354 The same is, of course, true of ordinary markets. For a good overview, see ANDREI
SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
355 As noted below, this is not inevitable. We could easily imagine a market in which
cognitive problems are reflected in prices; indeed, this appears to happen with ordinary
stock markets. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000) (dis-
cussing relationship between cognitive errors and stock prices). In information markets, it
is entirely possible to imagine booms or crashes produced by cognitive errors in combina-
tion with social influences. My point is not that this is impossible, but that the track record
of information markets, at least thus far, is exceptionally good.
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5. Building on Existing Practices
How might institutions take advantage of information markets?
It is possible to imagine both internal and public varieties. An
internal market would be limited to people within the relevant organi-
zation. As we have seen, Hewlett Packard has used such a market to
predict sales, 356 and the Department of Defense proposed an internal
Policy Analysis Market as part of its abandoned initiative on geopolit-
ical events. An external market would permit public investment by
people outside of the institution for which predictions are being made.
In either case, the outcome of the market might well be more accurate
than the outcome of deliberation, in which errors might arise and be
propagated or even amplified as a result of discussion. 357 An organi-
zation might rely on an internal market if it seeks to keep the results
private or if it believes that an aggregation of information held within
the organization will be sufficiently accurate. One risk of an internal
market is that it might be too "thin," simply because most institutions
will have few investors;358 another is that members of the organization
might suffer from a systematic bias. Alternatively, an institution
might create a public market, available to all, believing that through
this route it will obtain more accurate results. In either case, an
organization might use an information market instead of group delib-
eration, or at the very least as an input into such deliberation.
B. Failed Predictions? Of Manipulation, Bias, and Bubbles
In what circumstances might information markets fail? To
answer this question, ordinary stock markets are the place to start.359
A great deal of recent attention has been paid to the possibility that
individual traders are manipulable and also subject to identifiable
biases in a way that leads them to blunder.36° There is also a risk of
356 See generally CHEN & PLorr, supra note 302.
357 For companies, optimistic bias is an obvious risk-one that information markets
should reduce. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices & Bold Forecasts: A
Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. ScI. (Jan. 1993) reprinted in CHOICES,
VALUES & FRAMES 393, 393, 409-10 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (dis-
cussing decision makers' tendency to base forecasts of future outcomes on scenarios of
success and to ignore past statistics). For an application to group decisions, see JOHNSON,
supra note 25.
358 Note, however, that Hewlett Packard produced good predictions even in a thin
market. CHEN & PLOTr, supra note 302, at 5, 12.
359 A general overview arguing that markets will not necessarily attain efficiency is
SCHLEIFER, supra note 354.
360 See, e.g., id.; HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED & FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAV-
IORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000) (exploring markets' suscepti-
bility to cognitive errors); SHILLER, supra note 355 (discussing cognitive errors and their
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"prediction bubbles," leading people to inaccurate judgments about
future events.
1. Manipulation
A primary concern is that information markets, no less than ordi-
nary ones, can be susceptible to manipulation by powerful specula-
tors.361 One attempt to manipulate an information market occurred
during the 2000 presidential election. A group of speculators
attempted to manipulate the Iowa Electronic Markets by buying large
volumes of futures in presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan. The
value of Buchanan shares did increase dramatically, but they fell
almost immediately when "well-informed traders... seized the oppor-
tunity to profit off the manipulative traders .... "362 Hence the Iowa
market remained stable despite this attempted manipulation. Perhaps
other, more plausible efforts at manipulation would succeed; but none
have thus far.
2. Biases
Another concern is that some of the cognitive biases that afflict
individuals will manifest themselves in prediction markets. Just as in
group deliberation, investors in a market might be subject to predict-
able heuristics and biases.363 The results here are unequivocal: They
are subject to such effects. For example, psychologists have found
that people overestimate the likelihood that their preferred candidate
will win an election-a form of optimistic bias.364 At a certain point in
the 1980 campaign, 87% of Jimmy Carter's supporters believed that
he would win, while 80% of Ronald Reagan's supporters believed that
their candidate would win.365 Obviously, at least one side had overes-
timated its candidate's probability of victory at the relevant time.
In the market context, similar biases can be found. Certain gam-
blers in New York are especially likely to bet on the New York
Yankees;366 and IEM traders show the same bias. In 1988, for
effects on market prices); ADvANcEs IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed.,
1993) (investigating effects of how investors actually behave).
361 For a good discussion, see Abramowicz, supra note 299, at 972-76.
362 Klarreich, supra note 335, at 251, 253.
363 For an overview see SHILLER, supra note 355.
364 For an overview of optimistic bias, see Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Anal-
ysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1658-63 (1998).
365 Donald Granberg & Edward Brent, When Prophesy Bends: The Preference-Expecta-
tion Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1980, 45 J. Soc. & PERSONALrrY PSYCHOL.
477, 479 (1983).
366 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 118 (citing Koleman S. Strumpf, Manipu-
lating the Iowa Political Stock Market (2004) (unpublished mansuscript)).
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example, Dukakis supporters were more likely to hold futures in the
Massachusetts governor's ill-fated presidential bid than were sup-
porters of George H.W. Bush.367 More strikingly still, Dukakis sup-
porters were more likely to view the candidates' debates as helpful to
the Democratic candidate and accordingly bought significant addi-
tional futures in his campaign after each debate.368 Bush supporters
showed precisely the same pattern. Traders thus exhibited the "assim-
ilation-contrast" effect.369 People usually assimilate new information
in a way that confirms their view of the world, and those who invest in
information markets show the same bias. In general, traders show a
tendency to buy and sell in a way that fits with their party
identification.370
Nonetheless, the Iowa Electronic Markets were more accurate
than polls in predicting the outcome of the 1988 presidential election.
Even three weeks before the election, the market provided an almost-
perfect guess about the candidates' shares of the vote. 371 How is such
accuracy possible when many traders showed identifiable biases? The
answer may lie in the "marginal trader" hypothesis, about the
behavior of a small group of "marginal traders" who were far less sus-
ceptible to these biases. According to this hypothesis, a small group
of active traders who are far less susceptible to the relevant biases
have a disproportionately large effect on aggregate market behavio.
In trading election futures, these traders did not show the same biases
as their fellow traders and earned significant profits at the expense of
their quasi-rational colleagues.372 Thus, the biased behavior of most
traders did not affect the market price because the marginal traders
were prepared to take advantage of their blunders. If marginal
traders are active and able to profit from the bounded rationality of
other participants, then there will be no effect on the aggregate
market price.373
Another bias that might be expected to affect information mar-
kets is the "favorite-longshot" bias often seen in horse races. In horse
racing, heavy favorites tend to give higher returns than other horses in
367 Forsythe et al., Wishes, supra note 298, at 94.
368 Id. at 94-95.
369 See MUZAFER SHERIF & CARL I. HOVLAND, SOCIAL JUDGMENT: ASSIMILATION
AND CONTRAST EFFECTS IN COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 188 (1961) (dis-
cussing manner in which individuals filter information to conform to their pre-existing
positions).
370 Forsythe et al., Wishes, supra note 298, at 94.
371 Berg et al., supra note 316, at 42.
372 Forsythe et al., Wishes, supra note 298, at 99-100. The term "quasi-rational" comes
from RICHARD H. THALER, QUAsi-RATIONAL ECONOMICS xxi (1991).
373 See the discussion in SCHLEIFER, supra note 354, at 24, 51-52.
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the field, while longshots tend to offer lower than expected returns. 374
Hence near certainties are undervalued while low probabilities are
overvalued. If the point generalizes, prediction markets might not be
accurate with respect to highly improbable events. The market should
be expected to overestimate the likelihood that such events will come
to fruition; for example, Patrick Buchanan futures would be expected
to be (and might well have been) overpriced even before the
attempted manipulation of the market. By contrast, an information
market might underestimate the probability of events that are highly
likely to occur. But with respect to existing prediction markets, there
is only slight evidence of systematic errors in this vein.375
3. Bubbles and More
"Prediction bubbles" are also easy to imagine, with investors
moving in a certain direction with the belief that many other investors
are doing the same.376 A temporary upsurge in investment in the
nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton as 2004 Democratic nominee
might well have been a small bubble, with some investors thinking,
not that she would in fact be the nominee, but that others would
invest in that judgment, thus inflating the value of the investment.
Crashes are possible as well. In any case informational influences cer-
tainly can lead individuals to make foolish investments in any market,
including prediction markets.377 As information markets develop, sig-
nificant individual errors should be expected, and undoubtedly they
will produce some errors in the price signal. In the 2004 presidential
election, news of exit polls produced a great deal of volatility in elec-
tion markets, with a dramatic election-day swing in the direction of
Senator Kerry at the expense of President Bush. "Suddenly, Kerry's
stock in the Winner Take All market shot up to 70 cents and Bush
stock was in the cellar. '378 Large-scale errors are possible when
apparently relevant news leads numerous investors to buy or sell;
indeed, this particular shift may well have been a cascade, with inves-
374 See Richard H. Thaler & William T. Ziemba, Anomalies: Parimutuel Betting Mar-
kets: Racetracks and Lotteries, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 163 (1988) (exploring favorite-long-
shot bias); see also Charles F. Manski, Interpreting the Predictions of Prediction Markets
(Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review)
(summarizing horse-race data findings), available at http://faculty.econ.nwu.edu/faculty/
manski/prediction-markets.pdf.
375 The most important evidence can be found on Tradesports's predictions, where
highly unlikely outcomes were overpriced in a number of domains. See Wolfers &
Zitzewitz, supra note 299, at 117.
376 See id. at 118-19 (exploring speculative bubbles in context of information markets).
377 Cf. SHILLER, supra note 355 (discussing cognitive biases in trading context).
378 See Jordan, supra note 326.
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tors responding to one another's judgments, even though they were
based on false information. The erroneous figures were able to last
only for a few hours, however, after which the numbers returned to
their previous state of considerable accuracy.
In particular contexts, the imaginable problems take a different
form. Consider the problem of "terrorism futures." It would be
extremely valuable to aggregate privately held information about the
risk and location of any attack. But do likely investors actually pos-
sess helpful information? Thomas Rietz, a director of the Iowa Elec-
tronic Markets, argued that terrorism and world events were
fundamentally different from other contexts in which markets have
successfully predicted future events.379 When betting on presidential
elections, people can use ordinary information sources, along with
their network of friends, family, and co-workers, to form an opinion;
but for most investors, there are no such sources of information for
terrorist activity. Another skeptic worried that the market would
allow the wealthy to "hedge" against the possibility of terrorist
activity, while ordinary Americans would remain vulnerable to this
threat.380 In this view, "terrorism futures" could operate as an insur-
ance market that would not serve its purpose of providing informa-
tion. In any event, government use of the resulting information could
be self-defeating, at least if the information were made public. Ter-
rorists would know the anticipated time and location of attacks, and
also know that the government was aware of this-which would make
it most unlikely that the prediction would turn out to be accurate.
Where the event's occurrence is endogenous to the outcome of the
information market, there is reason for skepticism about its likely per-
formance, certainly if relevant actors have much to lose if the market
turns out to be correct. 381
But many policy issues, including those potentially involved in the
now-defunct Policy Analysis Market, did not have this feature. Con-
sider, for example, the question whether the Egyptian economy is
likely to grow in the next year, or whether a Palestinian state will be
created by the end of 2006. Perhaps many investors will lack a great
deal of information on such questions, but it is most unlikely that the
market prediction will turn out to be self-defeating. Of course the
379 Celeste Biever & Damian Carrington, Pentagon Cancels Futures Market on Terror,
NEWSCIEN-nST.COM, July 30, 2003, at http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=NS99
994007.
380 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Terrorism: There's No Futures in It, L.A. TIms, July 31, 2003 at
B17.
381 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 175-76 (2004)
(doubting usefulness of information markets in context of risk of terrorism).
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Policy Analysis Market itself raises many questions and doubts. And
the growing body of work in behavioral finance gives reason for cau-
tion about excessive faith in information markets;382 if ordinary stocks
can be overvalued and undervalued, the same is undoubtedly true for
predictions as well. The only point is that in many domains, informa-
tion markets are extremely promising, and likely to outperform both
statistical means and the products of group deliberation.
C. Feasibility, Markets, and Deliberation Again
Information markets face one pervasive problem: feasibility. A
jury, for example, could not enlist such markets to decide on questions
of guilt or innocence. Among other things, there is no objective way
to test whether the jury, or individual jurors, ended up with the right
answer (and if there were, the jury might be dispensable). Moreover,
it is not easy to see how information markets could be used by judges.
Of course factual questions are often relevant in court, but such mar-
kets could not easily be used to verify one or another answer. More
generally, information markets might suffer from a legitimacy deficit,
at least at the present time, where they remain unfamiliar. Recall that
deliberation increases confidence and decreases variance; in many
contexts, reliance on information markets might well breed confusion
and distrust.383
There is another problem. When the relevant groups are small,
effective markets may be impossible to create, simply because of the
absence of sufficient numbers of investors.384 A certain number is
necessary to ensure that information markets have enough informa-
tion to aggregate. On the other hand, administrative agencies might
well enlist such markets, 385 and ambitious efforts are underway to
examine how government might use them to answer an array of dis-
puted questions. 386 At a minimum, such markets should be used,
where feasible, as an adjunct to deliberative processes. Of course offi-
cials would not be bound by those predictions. They might reasonably
believe that investors are wrong. But if the outcomes of information
382 See SCHLEIFER, supra note 354; SHILLER, supra note 355.
383 Recall the reaction to the Policy Analysis Market, outlined supra in the text accom-
panying notes 312-16.
384 Note, however, that "thin" markets have proved remarkably accurate, see Levmore,
supra note 299, at 601-03 (discussing successes of thin markets), and that some small
groups might encourage outsider investors.
385 See Abramowicz, supra note 299, at 992-93 (arguing for much greater use of infor-
mation markets by administrative agencies).
386 See HAHN & TETLOCK, supra note 309, at 8 (arguing for multiple policy uses of
information markets).
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markets prove reliable over time, officials should accept them unless
they have grounds to believe that they are inaccurate. 38 7
As Michael Abramowicz has suggested, governments might use
information markets to help make projections about insolvency,
budget deficits, and the costs and benefits of proposed regulations.388
In each of these cases, deliberative processes might have a "reality
check" in the form of the predictions of information markets. It
would be possible to go much further. Officials might take into
account the market's prediction of the anticipated damage from a nat-
ural disaster, the number of annual deaths from an actual or antici-
pated disease (such as mad cow disease or AIDS), the number of
American casualties from a war effort, the existence of demonstrable
harms from global warming by (say) 2010,389 the likelihood of scarcity
of natural resources,390 decreases in tropical forests in the world,
demonstrable deterrent effects from capital punishment or other
severe punishments, 391 increases or decreases in emissions of specified
air pollutants, increases or decreases in concentrations of air pollution
in the ambient air, and much more. In all these cases, private or
public institutions might create markets to provide information on
387 One complication here is that the market's prediction would be affected by the likeli-
hood of government's response to that very prediction. If investors know, for example,
that government is likely to respond if the market predicts a high number of fatalities from
a natural disaster, then they should predict a lower number of fatalities, because govern-
ment will by hypothesis be taking protective steps. This problem might be handled by
conditional markets. For example, the question might be: "How many deaths will come
from earthquakes in the United States in a specified year if government does not take new
steps to prevent those deaths?"
388 Abramowicz, supra note 299, at 982-93.
389 For this example, and for others, it would of course be necessary to identify some
agreed-upon source for an answer to the predictive question. We might specify, for
example, that the judgment of the General Accounting Office is authoritative, rather than
leaving investors to debate which source is most reliable.
390 Consider here the famous bet between Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich about the
coming scarcity of natural resources. Simon had long predicted that natural resources were
essentially inexhaustible, whereas Ehrlich predicted that natural resources were running
out. The two bet, in 1980, on the price of five metals to be selected by Ehrlich: If, by 1990,
the price of the metals had risen (suggesting scarcity), Ehrlich would win. Ehrlich chose
copper, chrome, nickel, tin, and tungsten. Ehrlich lost the bet. By 1990, the price of each
of the five metals had fallen. For an overview, see Overpopulation.com, FAQ: People,
Julian Simon's Bet with Paul Ehrlich, at http://www.overpopulation.com/faq/People/ulian-
simon.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
391 As I have noted, it might be difficult, in some of these cases, to identify a source that
would be deemed sufficiently objective. A public source-say, the General Accounting
Office-might be specified as the relevant authority. For a relevant discussion on the diffi-
culty in selecting data criteria, see Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment
Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 344, 355 (2004).
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crucial questions; and public institutions might take that information
into account in making judgments about policy.
The broadest point is that, even when information markets are
not feasible, an understanding of their virtues helps illuminate the vir-
tues and vices of deliberation-and helps show how to obtain more of
the former and less of the latter. Such markets overcome the collec-
tive action problem from which deliberating groups suffer; they also
give people a strong incentive to say what they know and to back their
most well-grounded convictions with money. An understanding of
these points helps to show how to increase the likelihood that deliber-
ation will not fall prey to the problems I have emphasized here.
V
NORMATIVE QUESTIONS AND GROUP JUDGMENTS
Deliberating groups are often asked to answer questions that are
not purely factual. Issues involving morality, politics, and law require
assessment of normative issues. Should cost-benefit analysis be the
foundation of regulatory decisions? Should the minimum wage be
increased? Should capital punishment be permitted? Can the Presi-
dent be impeached for lying under oath? Should Roe v. Wade be
overruled? Should the Constitution be interpreted to require states to
reconsider same-sex marriages? When, if ever, is theft morally
acceptable?
When people answer such questions, informational influences
and social pressures are likely to play a major role. One study demon-
strates group polarization with respect to outrage: When individuals
are outraged about corporate misconduct, juries become systemati-
cally more outraged than their median member. 392 And in fact group
discussion often produces polarization on normative issues,393 sug-
gesting the presence of hidden profiles.394 It is on normative ques-
tions, above all, that groups end up at a more extreme point in line
with their predeliberation tendencies. 395 I have noted that in many
domains, federal judges are subject to group polarization, with both
Democratic and Republican appointees showing a tendency to
392 See David Schkade et al., supra note 209, at 1155 (showing severity shift within
juries).
393 See BROWN, supra note 22, at 220-26 (discussing group polarization); SUNsT-IN,
supra note 21, at 120-24 (exploring sources of polarization).
394 If groups are polarizing toward an extreme position, it may well be because certain
information, not widely shared within the group, remains hidden.
395 See BROWN, supra note 22, at 222-26.
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extremism when they are sitting with like-minded others.396 We might
therefore attempt to find ways to reduce the potential problems of
deliberation when groups are exploring normative questions, not
simply questions of fact.
It might be controversial to suggest that groups amplify individual
errors in the normative domain, because in that domain, we might not
be able to say with confidence that one or another view counts as an
"error." Skeptics about morality and law, rejecting the view that
moral and legal questions have correct answers, would insist that any
shifts introduced by deliberation cannot be said to be right or wrong.
But if they are correct, does deliberation have any point?397 In any
case, skepticism is extremely hard to defend for law or morality. We
may bracket the debate over whether legal problems have uniquely
correct answers in hard cases 398 while also agreeing that, on multiple
and diverse views about legal reasoning, some conclusions are right
and others are wrong.399 And if deliberation is often likely to lead
people to err on questions of fact, it will also lead participants in law
to blunder on questions of law. Suppose, for example, that the ques-
tion is whether a regulatory agency has violated the statute that it is
charged with administering, or whether a particular voting scheme
violates the Equal Protection Clause, or whether the impossibility
doctrine relieves a contracting party of the duty to perform. In all of
these cases, groups are likely to err if their deliberations are not struc-
tured in such a way as to overcome the risks of amplification of errors,
hidden profiles, cascade effects, and group polarization.
In the moral domain, skepticism also runs into serious
problems.4°° Without engaging the complex philosophical issues, we
396 See Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 23, at 305 (finding polarization in voting
by federal judges).
397 A possible answer would stress the legitimating functions of deliberation, see supra
note 9 and accompanying text, but for deliberation to work, and even to legitimate,
deliberators must believe that they are trying to make progress on a disputed question, not
simply to legitimate it. An effort to justify deliberation purely on the ground that it is
legitimating will tend to be self-defeating for the participants.
398 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 144-45 (1985) (arguing that legal
disputes have right answers).
399 This proposition follows, for example, from views as diverse as those expressed by
Ronald Dworkin, Antonin Scalia, and Cass Sunstein. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 255 (1986) (defending idea of "integrity," in which judges attempt to decide legal
issues on the basis of broad principles); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION
23-24 (1997) (defending textualism); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLIT-
ICAL CONFLICT 35-44 (1996) (defending use of incompletely theorized agreements in law).
400 Perspectives on skepticism vary widely. See generally DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL
REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989) (defending moral realism as founda-
tion for ethics); GILBERT HARMON & JUDITH JARVIS THOMPSON, MORAL RELATIVISM
AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996) (critiquing arguments for moral skepticism); JOHN
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can simply note that many different views about the nature of
morality acknowledge the possibility of individual error-and that if
individual error does occur, group error will occur as well. As obvious
examples, consider the persistence of slavery and racial segregation.
As a less obvious example, consider the fact that people's answers to
many questions depend on how those questions are framed. The
framing of options affects judgments not only on factual questions but
on moral ones as well, including, for example, the disputed issue of
moral obligations to members of future generations.40 1 As noted,
groups do not show less susceptibility to framing effects than individ-
uals;40 2 it follows that groups will be vulnerable to framing for ques-
tions of morality and law as well as for questions of fact.
No information market could be helpful in answering normative
questions, simply because there is no way to establish whether a par-
ticular investor was correct; for normative questions, predictions are
not being made at all.40 3 And for such questions, it might seem odd or
perhaps even bizarre to rely on the judgments of statistical groups. To
be sure, democratic processes might be seen as an effort to settle
moral and political issues by seeking the mean view within the rele-
vant population (views that are formed after deliberation, at least
much of the time). But to say the least, it is controversial to claim that
moral and political questions are best answered by simply finding the
mean views of a population-wide sample. Is the morality of abortion,
or capital punishment, properly settled by asking for the average view
of a group of, say, one thousand people? Is a legal question to be
resolved by taking the median view of a large set of people trained in
the law?
Ordinarily moral and legal answers are found by reference to the
reasons offered on behalf of competing positions, not by taking a poll.
Suppose it is true that the average judgment is accurate when large
groups are asked about the number of beans in a jar, the weight of a
large animal, or the temperature in a room. Perhaps it follows that
the average judgment will be accurate when large groups are asked
about abortion, capital punishment, and preemptive war. But system-
atic biases or errors may infect the judgments of group members,
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-53 (1971) (discussing search for reflective equilibrium);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, Interlude: Relativism, in MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHIcs
20, 20-26 (1972) (condemning functionalist view of moral relativism).
401 See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556,
1591-94 (2004) (discussing effects of framing in context of rights of future generations).
402 See Kerr et al., supra note 64, at 688, 698-702.
403 It might be tempting to say that the moral views of posterity provide the relevant
test, but then the bet would be on the moral views of posterity, not on what morality
requires.
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making the Condorcet Jury Theorem inapplicable, and there is no
simple way to test whether this is so.
Note, however, that empirical questions are often a central com-
ponent of good answers to normative problems; many such problems
cannot be resolved without knowing something about the facts. The
analysis of mistakes by deliberating groups should apply in full force
to the factual components of normative questions. Consider, for
example, the suggestion that the minimum wage should be increased.
If minimum wage increases would significantly decrease employment,
surely that is relevant to the decision whether to support such
increases; and it matters too whether minimum wage increases would
benefit poor people or mostly people who are not poor. 40 4
To be sure, these are empirical questions which experts are
almost certainly far better able to answer accurately than deliberating
groups of ordinary people. The point is only that many normative
questions cannot sensibly be resolved without information about the
actual effects of one or another answer. When this is so, an under-
standing of the hazards of deliberation, and how to minimize those
hazards, can be used constructively by groups that are attempting to
resolve normative questions. Of course consequences may not be the
central part of some normative disputes. Some people believe, for
example, that capital punishment is morally unacceptable even if it
has a strong effect in deterring murders, and evaluative judgments of
various kinds can separate people even if they agree on the facts.40 5
But the more general point nonetheless holds: Sometimes a certain
view of the facts can bring diverse people into line on normative
issues, producing a single position'despite disagreements on those
issues. To this extent, the analysis here applies to normative questions
as well. Group judgments on such questions will be distorted by the
amplification of errors, hidden profiles, cascade effects, and polariza-
tion. It is important to take steps, of the kind that I have catalogued,
to reduce those distortions.
What about for purely normative issues, lacking any factual com-
ponent? Here the argument on behalf of group deliberation is not
fundamentally different from what it is elsewhere. 40 6 Unless we are
404 For an analysis of empirical evidence on who benefits from minimum wage legisla-
tion, see Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 433-39 (1997).
405 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1308 (2003) (emphasizing role
of culture in producing perceptions of risks).
406 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 1-9 (discussing virtues of deliberative
conception of democracy).
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relativists or skeptics, we will agree that one point of deliberation is to
ensure that normative questions are correctly answered, that is, are
answered by reference to good reasons, even if we disagree about
what they are. And if this is so, then there is strong reason to be
concerned, for normative questions no less than empirical ones, that
group judgments will be impaired by the mechanisms traced here.
The structural reforms have an equivalent role in the normative
domain. We may therefore take the simple cases I have emphasized,
in which deliberation leads to palpable and demonstrable errors, to
provide clear evidence of deliberative pathologies that are likely to
occur even when errors are neither palpable nor demonstrable. If a
central goal is to ensure that normative questions-in law, politics,
and morality-are answered well, then the prescriptions I have out-
lined deserve a place in numerous deliberating groups, including those
not centrally concerned with facts at all.
A more general lesson follows. Many people have celebrated
deliberative conceptions of democracy, largely with the thought that
deliberative processes are likely to lead participants in better or more
sensible directions. The underlying judgment is easy to understand.
New perspectives can broaden old ones, ensuring that people see far
more, as a result of deliberation, than they saw before. Everyone has
had the experience, on questions of value as well as of fact, of learning
from the claims offered by others. But if the argument here is correct,
that experience can be misleading. Even under ideal conditions,
emphasized by proponents of deliberation,40 7 group members can be
led to err, not despite deliberation but because of it. When members
of a religious community end up entrenched in their belief in (say)
traditional gender roles, or when members of a liberal group end up
still more committed to a highly progressive income tax, social
dynamics, leaving hidden profiles, may well be responsible. The fact
that deliberation increases confidence, and reduces variance, will
leave the strong but potentially misleading impression that delibera-
tion has produced sense rather than nonsense.
Nothing I have said here is meant to suggest that deliberation
should be eliminated, or that on normative questions, groups would
do better to rely on some kind of statistical average. The proper
response to the problems I have traced is to structure deliberative
processes so as to ensure that relevant points of view will emerge as a
result of those processes. With values as well as facts, it is crucial to
prime critical thinking and to encourage group members to believe
that cooperation, in the form of quiescence, can be greatly overrated.
407 See generally HABERMAS, supra note 4; GurTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4.
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In the abstract, advice of this sort risks vacuousness. But I hope that I
have said enough to show that such advice can be used as the basis for
concrete institutional recommendations, designed to ensure that even
like-minded groups contain mechanisms that promote a kind of
internal system of checks and balances.
CONCLUSION
Groups often contain a great deal of information, and an impor-
tant task is to elicit and use the information that members actually
have. Deliberation is generally thought to be the best way of carrying
out that task. But deliberative bodies are subject to serious problems.
Much of the time, informational influences and social pressures lead
members not to say what they know. As a result, groups tend to prop-
agate, and even to amplify, cognitive errors. They also emphasize
shared information at the expense of unshared information; hidden
profiles are a result. Cascade effects and group polarization are also
common. Those interested in deliberative democracy have yet to pay
adequate attention to these problems, which are likely to lead deliber-
ating groups to blunder even if participants behave in accordance with
the conditions of the deliberative ideal. Here, then, is a context in
which political philosophy does not engage with existing work, both
theoretical and empirical, on individual and social cognition.
What can be done by way of response? At the very least, it
should be possible to structure deliberation so as to increase the likeli-
hood that relevant information will emerge. A norm in favor of crit-
ical thinking, and incentives to reward individuals for good decisions
by groups, can overcome some of the relevant pressures. Leaders
should take steps to encourage a wide range of views; to do this,
leaders might be cautious about expressing their own views at the
outset and should encourage reasons, rather than conclusions, before
the views of group members start to harden. Institutions might ensure
anonymity and private polling before deliberation; they might permit
anonymous statements of final conclusions; they might create strong
incentives, economic and otherwise, to encourage people to disclose
what they know.
Information markets have significant advantages over delibera-
tive processes, and in many contexts they might supplement or even
replace those processes. Such markets tend to correct rather than to
amplify individual errors, above all because they allow shrewd inves-
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tors to take advantage of the mistakes made by others.40 8 Because
information markets provide economic rewards for correct individual
answers, they realign incentives in a way that promotes disclosure. As
a result, they are often more accurate than the judgments of deliber-
ating groups. To the extent feasible, many groups would often do well
to enlist information markets in arriving at their judgments, above all
because of the accuracy of the price signal.
My emphasis throughout has been on the aggregation of informa-
tion and the risk that deliberating groups will err on instrumental
questions and on issues of fact. But the same risks arise in the norma-
tive domain, where informational influences and social pressures also
produce forms of self-silencing that are highly damaging to good
deliberation. In that domain, as elsewhere, it makes no sense to cele-
brate deliberation in the abstract. Incentives make all the difference.
Well-functioning groups take steps to ensure that on normative ques-
tions, as on factual ones, people feel free to disclose what they believe
to be true.
408 Note that this is an empirical claim, not a conceptual one. It is certainly possible for
markets to propagate individual errors. See generally SHILLER, supra note 355 (discussing
role of cognitive errors in stock market).
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